In re the Personal Restraint of Stockwell, 316 P.3d 1007

Background

In 1986 Daniel Stockwell pleaded guilty to first-degree statutory rape; his plea form and judgment misstated the statutory maximum as 20 years (actual maximum = life).
He received a downward SSOSA sentence (24 months treatment, 12 months supervision), completed it in 1989, and was discharged.
A 1989 statutory one-year time limit for collateral attacks (RCW 10.73.090) required DOC to attempt notice to those under community supervision; Stockwell says he received no notice.
In 2004 Stockwell’s later convictions triggered a life sentence as a persistent offender; he filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) attacking the 1986 plea as involuntary due to the misstatement of the maximum.
Lower courts found the petition timely (DOC failed to give notice) but concluded Stockwell failed to show prejudice from the misinformation; the Washington Supreme Court granted review on whether collateral relief required a showing of actual and substantial prejudice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Stockwell)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Timeliness of PRP under RCW 10.73.090 (did DOC attempt notice?)	Statute’s one-year bar should not apply because DOC did not attempt to notify him while he was under supervision.	DOC’s posting satisfied attempt in many cases; time bar should apply.	Court: Petition not time barred here because Stockwell lacked opportunity to see notices; DOC’s postings after discharge did not satisfy attempt.
Standard of prejudice required in a PRP challenging an involuntary plea based on misinformation of statutory maximum	Misstatement presumptively prejudicial (as on direct appeal); no need to prove actual and substantial prejudice on collateral review.	Collateral review requires higher finality standard; petitioner must show actual and substantial prejudice.	Court: On collateral review petitioner must show actual and substantial prejudice from the misstatement; presumption of prejudice on direct appeal does not automatically carry to PRP.
Whether Stockwell met actual and substantial prejudice standard	(implied) Misinformation about maximum rendered plea involuntary.	He received a lawful downward SSOSA sentence, completed it decades earlier; no practical prejudice shown.	Court: Stockwell failed to show actual and substantial prejudice; PRP denied.
Scope of precedents (St. Pierre, Isadore, Bradley, Weyrich, Mendoza) — do direct-appeal presumptions control PRP?	Prior cases support presuming prejudice for plea-misinformation claims on collateral review.	St. Pierre and later cases require distinguishing direct-appeal presumptions from PRP finality interests.	Court: Clarifies that St. Pierre rejects a categorical carryover; direct-appeal presumptions do not automatically control PRP; actual-and-substantial prejudice generally required.

Key Cases Cited

In re Personal Restraint of McKiearnan, 165 Wn.2d 777 (2009) (addressed facial invalidity/time-bar context)
In re Personal Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123 (2011) (clarified PRP standards)
In re Personal Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321 (1992) (rejected categorical rule equating direct-appeal per se prejudice with PRP per se prejudice)
In re Personal Restraint of Hagler, 97 Wn.2d 818 (1982) (established PRP burden requiring actual and substantial prejudice for trial errors)
State v. Weyrich, 163 Wn.2d 554 (2008) (on direct appeal, misinformation of statutory maximum may render plea involuntary)
State v. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d 582 (2006) (direct-appeal treatment of plea voluntariness when direct consequences misrepresented)
In re Personal Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wn.2d 294 (2004) (applied direct-appeal standard in unusual PRP posture; discussed materiality vs voluntariness)
In re Personal Restraint of Fawcett, 147 Wn.2d 298 (2002) (required actual and substantial prejudice for sentencing-consequence misinformation on PRP)
In re Personal Restraint of Richardson, 100 Wn.2d 669 (1983) (recognized some errors may presume prejudice on collateral review)