In re the Personal Restraint of Finstad, 177 Wash. 2d 501

Finstad faced multiple felony charges and entered a global plea deal after two jury convictions, with a plan for most sentences to run concurrently but a potential consecutive sentence for an enhancement.
The State proposed a 120-month total sentence including three consecutive sentences and two concurrent sentences for other counts, with no explicit written exceptional-sentence findings.
Judge accepted the pleas and largely followed the State’s recommendation but did not enter the required exceptional-sentence findings under RCW 9.94A.589.
Three years later, Finstad challenged the judgments via a personal restraint petition, arguing the exceptional consecutive sentences lacked required findings and that the State did not file RCW 9.94A.537 notice.
The State conceded the judgments and sentences were not valid on their faces for lack of RCW 9.94A.589 findings and that Finstad had overcome the time bar, but argued he was not prejudiced, leading to a dismissal by the Court of Appeals which the Supreme Court reviewed.
The Court ultimately held that, despite facial invalidity and time-bar relief, Finstad did not establish actual and substantial prejudice to warrant relief, aligning with recent Chambers precedent and upholding dismissal/affirmation on different grounds.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prejudice must be shown for collateral review of illegal sentencing under SRA	Finstad claims prejudice from improper consecutive sentences	State contends prejudice not shown based on record	Prejudice not shown; petition denied
Whether failure to enter RCW 9.94A.589 findings is nonconstitutional or constitutional error	Error is foundational and prejudicial	Error is nonconstitutional and not prejudicial given actual sentence	Error treated as nonconstitutional with no prejudice shown under standards (Chambers), dismissing relief
Impact of time-bar overcome on review and Wang effect on relief	Time-bar overcome allows merits review	Overcoming time-bar insufficient without prejudice	Time-bar overcome; still require prejudice; relief denied
Remedy for unlawful sentence when SRA violated	Remand for lawful sentence is required	Possibility of lawful alternative sentence exists; not necessarily remand	Remand for lawful sentence aligns with precedent; not resentencing here.
Constitutional dimension—Apprendi/Blakely impact on consecutive-sentence enhancements	Findings required beyond a reasonable doubt for enhancements	Blakely/Apprendi not controlling for consecutive sentencing per Ice/Vance	Apprendi/Blakely require appropriate fact-finding; however majority avoids full rule due to procedural posture.

In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123 (Wash. 2011) (high prejudice standard for collateral relief; nonconstitutional defects require prejudice)
State v. Chambers, 176 Wn.2d 573 (Wash. 2013) (prejudice required despite lack of explicit findings; Chambers reprimand for lack of findings; remand allowed for lawful sentence)
CrR 4.2(f), — (—) (withdrawal of guilty plea only for manifest injustice (rule cited in opinion))
In re Pers. Restraint of Ermels, 156 Wn.2d 528 (Wash. 2006) (global plea and procedural constraints in PRP context)
In re Pers. Restraint of Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802 (Wash. 1990) (necessity of prejudice showing for collateral relief)
State v. Barber, 170 Wn.2d 854 (Wash. 2011) (no punishment beyond legislature via plea agreements; limits on variance from SRA)
In re Pers. Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861 (Wash. 2002) (limits on punishment beyond SRA via collateral claims)
In re Pers. Restraint of Gardner, 94 Wn.2d 504 (Wash. 1980) (avoidance of unauthorized punishments under statute)