In re the Personal Restraint of Carter
172 Wash. 2d 917
| Wash. | 2011Background
- Carter was convicted in 1998 in Pierce County of two counts of first-degree robbery and sentenced as a persistent offender to life in prison, with prior offenses including a 1983 California assault with a firearm on a police officer and a 1990 Oregon attempted murder.
- Carter timely appealed on comparability of his California conviction to Washington strike offenses; the Court of Appeals affirmed, and this Court denied review in 2000.
- In 2007 Carter filed a untimely personal restraint petition (PRP) alleging shackling due process violations and improper comparability-based sentencing; he argued he did not receive proper notice of RCW 10.73.090 time bar exemptions.
- The Court of Appeals dismissed the shackling claim as untimely and applied the federal actual innocence doctrine to the comparability issue, vacating the persistent offender sentence and remanding for resentencing on comparability.
- This Court granted review to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the actual innocence doctrine to Carter’s untimely PRP and remanded to consider Carter’s other time-bar exempting claims; it held that actual innocence could be considered only after addressing nondefaulted time-bar exceptions.
- The Court ultimately held that while actual innocence is a potential narrow exception for persistent-offender challenges, the Court of Appeals erred by applying it before considering other time-bar exceptions and remanded for consideration of those alternatives.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the actual innocence doctrine applies to Carter’s untimely PRP over a persistent offender sentence. | Carter argues actual innocence excuses the time bar to challenge comparability. | State contends actual innocence is an improper vehicle to bypass RCW 10.73.090 and should not prevail over other time-bar exemptions. | The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred by applying actual innocence before addressing other time-bar exceptions; remanded to consider those claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386 (U.S. 2004) (avoidance principle; keep actual innocence as narrow exception)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (U.S. 1995) (gateway actual innocence standard for procedural bars)
- Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (U.S. 1992) (actual innocence burden in capital sentencing context)
- Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (U.S. 1986) (necessity of showing actual innocence to excuse constitutional error)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Bonds, 165 Wn.2d 135 (Wash. 2008) (equitable tolling of time bar limited to narrow circumstances)
- In re Personal Restraint of Turay, 153 Wn.2d 44 (Wash. 2004) (distinguishes civil confinement from criminal sentencing and factual innocence)
- Lavery, 154 Wn.2d 249 (Wash. 2005) (foreign offenses counted as strike if comparable)
- Sawyer v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (U.S. 1986) (context for actual innocence in sentencing)
- Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490 (4th Cir. 1999) (scope of actual innocence in noncapital sentencing)
- Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002) (applies actual innocence to habitual offender context (circuit view))
- Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1997) (limits actual innocence in noncapital sentencing)