In Re The Personal Restraint Petition Of Lia Yera Tricomo, 463 P.3d 760

Background

In April 2013, Lia Yera Tricomo, who had been prescribed Paxil following a suicide attempt, fatally strangled John Alkins after slitting his throat; she confessed and referenced medication effects.
Tricomo was charged (after amendment) with second-degree murder, three counts of second-degree assault (different wounds), and taking a motor vehicle; she pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with a stated standard range of 257–357 months and the State reserving the right to recommend 357 months.
At sentencing the defense submitted expert reports (Dixon, Fernandez) asserting Paxil use/withdrawal affected intent; the State’s expert (Young) disputed Paxil withdrawal and attributed symptoms to alcohol. The court rejected Fernandez’s Paxil section for lack of expertise but considered Dixon and Young.
The trial court imposed the top of the standard range (357 months). Tricomo appealed; the Court of Appeals affirmed. She then filed a timely pro se personal restraint petition (PRP) raising double jeopardy, sentencing error for failing to consider Paxil evidence, ineffective assistance at plea, and prosecutorial misconduct.
After counsel appeared, Tricomo filed a supplemental PRP raising a new claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a qualified Paxil expert at sentencing; the Court of Appeals held this supplemental claim time-barred and denied relief on the original claims on various grounds.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Double jeopardy from multiple assault convictions	Multiple assault convictions reflect same course of conduct; violate double jeopardy	Issue already litigated on direct appeal; no new facts warrant relitigation	Not reconsidered — previously raised and resolved on direct appeal; petition declined on this ground
Trial court refusal to consider Fernandez’s Paxil section at sentencing	Court erred by excluding mitigation material on Paxil effects	Fernandez lacked medical/forensic expertise; court still considered expert opinions from Dixon and Young	No fundamental defect; court properly excluded Fernandez and considered other experts; sentence affirmed
Ineffective assistance of counsel & prosecutorial misconduct at plea	Counsel and prosecutor colluded to secure plea at top of range and included unnecessary assault count; counsel ineffective in plea bargaining	Plea reduced charges and exposure; defendant understood terms; counsel argued for lower sentence; no specific prosecutorial misconduct shown	IAC claim fails (no deficient performance or prejudice); prosecutorial misconduct claim unsupported and fails
Supplemental IAC claim — failure to retain qualified Paxil expert (filed >1 year)	New IAC claim is "part and parcel" of original timely claims or court should extend time to consider it	New claim rests on distinct facts/legal theory and is untimely; Court of Appeals lacks inherent authority to extend RCW time-bar	Time-barred; not ‘‘part and parcel’’ of earlier claims; Court declines to extend statutory deadline and denies supplemental claim

Key Cases Cited

In re Personal Restraint of Sandoval, 189 Wn.2d 811 (establishes error/prejudice standards for PRPs)
In re Pers. Restraint of Finstad, 177 Wn.2d 501 (discusses fundamental defect/complete miscarriage standard)
In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123 (PRP collateral relief is extraordinary)
State v. Blair, 191 Wn.2d 155 (standard-range sentence review: abuse of discretion/misapplication of law)
State v. Porter, 133 Wn.2d 177 (standard for reversing sentence)
State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474 (standard-range sentence review limitations)
State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419 (broad discretion in sources/types of evidence at sentencing)
In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647 (limits on relitigation; when issues resolved on direct appeal)
In re Pers. Restraint of Haghighi, 178 Wn.2d 435 (amendments/new claims to PRP must be timely; distinguishes "part and parcel")
In re Pers. Restraint of Wilson, 169 Wn. App. 379 (when supplemental IAC claim may be "part and parcel" of timely claim)
In re Pers. Restraint of Elmore, 162 Wn.2d 236 (prejudice standard for IAC in plea process)
In re Pers. Restraint of Lui, 188 Wn.2d 525 (prosecutorial misconduct standard on collateral review)
In re Pers. Restraint of Rice, 118 Wn.2d 876 (pleading particulars — factual particularity required in PRP)
In re Personal Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868 (RAP cannot override statute; limits on extending statutory deadlines)
In re Personal Restraint of Bonds, 165 Wn.2d 135 (RAP 18.8(a) does not allow alteration of statutory PRP time limits)