2025 CO 18
Colo.2025Background
- In 2023, Patrick L. Beverly II was accused of selling fentanyl pills to Matthew Bowen, who died that night from fentanyl intoxication, ruled a suicide by the county coroner.
- The State of Colorado charged Beverly with distribution of less than four grams of fentanyl, seeking enhanced penalties under § 18-18-405(2)(a)(III)(A) since the drugs were allegedly the proximate cause of Bowen’s death.
- Evidence included Bowen’s suicide note and expert testimony stating Bowen ingested fentanyl with lethal intent.
- The prosecution filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of Bowen’s suicidal intent, arguing it was irrelevant to proximate cause under the statute; the trial court denied this motion.
- The prosecution sought extraordinary relief from the Colorado Supreme Court, arguing the trial court erred in allowing consideration of Bowen’s intent, a legal issue of first impression in Colorado.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relevance of suicidal intent to proximate cause under § 18-18-405 | Evidence of the decedent's intent is irrelevant; death from distributed fentanyl is always foreseeable regardless of intent | Suicidal intent may constitute an intervening (unforeseeable) cause, breaking the causal chain from distribution to death | Evidence of purchaser’s suicidal intent may be relevant to proximate cause; trial court did not err |
| Statutory interpretation—meaning of "proximate cause" | Legislature intended to enhance penalties whenever a purchaser dies from distributed fentanyl, regardless of accidental or intentional overdose | "Proximate cause" imports limitations of foreseeability and intervening causes; legislature could have used broader terms | Statute requires actual proximate cause; jury must decide foreseeability and role of intervening causes |
| Admissibility: CRE 402 and CRE 403 | Evidence of suicidal intent risks confusing the jury and is minimally probative | Evidence is probative to whether an intervening cause (suicide) broke the chain of causation | Evidence admissible; not unduly confusing or prejudicial under these facts |
| Fact-finding: Jury or Judge | Jury may not consider decedent’s intent; only the act of distribution matters | Jury should resolve factual disputes about foreseeability and proximate cause | Factual disputes about proximate cause go to jury |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Rockwell, 125 P.3d 410 (Colo. 2005) (addresses plain-language statutory interpretation and the legal meaning of proximate cause)
- People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002) (discusses intervening causes and their effect on proximate cause)
- People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez, 971 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1998) (establishes the three-part test for intervening cause)
- People v. Lopez, 97 P.3d 277 (Colo. App. 2004) (summarizes requirements for intervening causes in causal analysis)
- People v. Hamrick, 624 P.2d 1320 (Colo. 1981) (victim's pre-existing conditions do not break causation chain)
- People v. Fite, 627 P.2d 761 (Colo. 1981) (gross negligence and intervening cause in homicide context)
- Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (clarifies distinction between but-for cause and proximate cause in criminal law)