2021 CO 61
Colo.2021Background
- Defendant Ian Sherwood was charged with possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia and pled not guilty on Sept. 9, 2020; the statutory six‑month speedy‑trial deadline was March 9, 2021.
- Trial was set for Jan. 25, 2021, continued over Sherwood’s objection to March 1, 2021 (eight days before the deadline).
- On March 1 the court declared a mistrial under Crim. P. 24(c)(4) because it could not safely assemble a fair jury due to COVID‑19; the court tolled/treated the speedy‑trial period as affected and later set trial for April 26 after consulting its calendar.
- The trial court believed the March 1 mistrial automatically "extended" the six‑month period by three months (to June 1); parties and the court later disputed whether the statute requires an extension or tolling and how to compute the new deadline.
- The People filed a C.A.R. 21 petition seeking clarification, arguing the tolling ended March 9 and that the new deadline was March 17 (so April 26 would be too late); the Supreme Court exercised original jurisdiction to decide the issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Sherwood / Trial Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a mistrial effects an "extension" of the six‑month statutory speedy‑trial period or merely "tolls" it | Mistrial does not extend the six‑month period; it tolled only for days actually attributable to the mistrial (here, March 1–9), producing a new deadline of March 17 | The trial court viewed the mistrial as tolling but treated delays as excludable up to three months and effectively set a new deadline (May 4), consistent with tolled time | Mistrial triggers tolling (not an automatic three‑month extension); court affirmed tolling framework from §18‑1‑405(6)(e) |
| Whether delays between March 1 and April 26 were attributable to the mistrial and reasonable (and therefore excludable up to three months) | Only the short delay to March 9 was attributable; the later gap to April 26 was not sufficiently tied to the March 1 mistrial and thus not excludable | The entire March 1–April 26 period was part of the court’s continuous efforts to seat a jury amidst COVID, was attributable and reasonable (including docket/calendar constraints) and under three months | The court held the March 1–April 26 delay was attributable to the mistrial, reasonable, and shorter than three months, so it must be excluded from the speedy‑trial computation |
| Whether the April 26, 2021 trial date violated Sherwood’s statutory speedy‑trial right | If tolling ended March 9, the new deadline would be March 17 and April 26 would be outside the speedy period | The court’s exclusion of the March 1–April 26 delay left eight days remaining on April 26, making May 4 the applicable deadline and April 26 timely | The Supreme Court held April 26 fell within the tolled speedy‑trial period (new deadline May 4); discharged the rule and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Lucy, 467 P.3d 332 (Colo. 2020) (distinguishes extension provisions from tolling provisions in the speedy‑trial statute)
- People v. DeGreat, 461 P.3d 11 (Colo. 2020) (prohibition and jurisdictional relief for trials conducted outside statutory speedy‑trial time)
- Pinelli v. District Court, 595 P.2d 225 (Colo. 1979) (rejects a rigid/mechanistic application of mistrial tolling; delays after consultation of the courtroom calendar may be reasonable)
- People v. Pipkin, 655 P.2d 1360 (Colo. 1982) (delay caused by mistrial is excludable only if reasonable)
- People v. Martin, 732 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1987) (statute should not be applied in a wooden fashion that undermines enforcement of criminal laws)