480 P.3d 114
Colo.2021Background
- David Subjack and Darryl Lynch were serving DOC sentences when each was arrested for possession of contraband in the first degree (class 4 felony) after correctional officers found dangerous instruments.
- Arrest warrants issued and cash-only bonds were set ($10,000 for Subjack; $5,000 for Lynch); neither posted bond and remained incarcerated in DOC custody.
- Both defendants requested preliminary hearings under § 16-5-301(1)(b)(II) and Crim. P. 7(h)(1); magistrate and district court denied or vacated the hearings, applying a "primary basis" test from People v. Taylor and People v. Pena.
- Defendants filed original petitions under C.A.R. 21; the Colorado Supreme Court issued rules to show cause and heard the consolidated matters en banc.
- The Supreme Court held that, on these facts, the defendants were "in custody for the offense" charged in Fremont County (because they had not posted bond) and therefore entitled to preliminary hearings; the court overruled Taylor and Pena.
- The matters were remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Subjack / Lynch) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an inmate who cannot post bond is "in custody for the offense" and thus entitled to a preliminary hearing. | Not entitled: the DOC sentence is the primary basis of custody, so defendants are not "in custody for" the Fremont County charges. | Entitled: because arrest warrants were issued and cash bonds were not posted, they remain in custody on the Fremont County charges. | Held for defendants: they are in custody for the Fremont County offenses and entitled to preliminary hearings. |
| Whether courts must apply a "primary basis" or "substantial nexus" test before finding a defendant "in custody for the offense." | The court should apply the "primary basis" approach (Taylor/Pena) and deny hearings where another confinement is the primary basis. | Statutory text does not require a "primary basis" qualifier; plain language entitles any defendant "in custody for the offense" to a hearing. | Held: rejected and overruled the "primary basis" approach; plain statutory language controls. |
| Whether the purpose of the preliminary hearing (protecting pretrial liberty) precludes hearings for defendants who will remain incarcerated on other sentences. | Hearing is unnecessary because defendants will remain incarcerated on DOC sentences; preliminary hearing would not advance pretrial liberty. | Preliminary hearings also screen for probable cause and can affect parole/other consequences; statutory right should not be denied on policy grounds. | Held: statutory entitlement prevails; preliminary hearing is a screening device and may have practical effects (e.g., parole). |
| Whether the Supreme Court should exercise original jurisdiction to resolve the question. | People implicitly argued deference to lower courts; did not oppose reviewability. | Defendants sought immediate relief because appellate review could be moot after trial. | Held: Court exercised original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 due to issue of first impression and potential mootness. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Taylor, 104 P.3d 269 (Colo. App. 2004) (adopted the "primary basis" approach to custody for preliminary-hearing entitlement)
- People v. Pena, 250 P.3d 592 (Colo. App. 2009) (followed Taylor and held defendant not "in custody" for new charges when primary custody lay elsewhere)
- Russell v. People, 462 P.3d 1092 (Colo. 2020) (clarified presentence confinement-credit analysis and that confinement may be caused by charges in multiple jurisdictions)
- Maestas v. Dist. Ct., 541 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1975) (describes preliminary hearing as a screening device to test sufficiency of the prosecution's case)
- People v. Brothers, 308 P.3d 1213 (Colo. 2013) (characterizes the restricted purpose of the preliminary hearing as screening out unwarranted prosecutions)