In re the Parental Rights to K.M.M.
379 P.3d 75
Wash.2016Background
- Child K.M.M. was removed in 2009 for parental substance abuse; she has been in foster care since age 6½ and was 11 at trial; she expressed a desire to be adopted by foster parents and, since May 2012, refused contact with her biological parents.
- Father J.M. completed court-ordered services and remedied identified parental deficiencies, but visits ceased after the child resisted and a single "natural contact" in Dec. 2012 was traumatic for K.M.M.
- The Department petitioned to terminate parental rights; the trial court found RCW 13.34.180(1) elements satisfied and concluded J.M. was "unable to parent" because the parent–child attachment no longer existed and could not be repaired without harming the child.
- The Court of Appeals and this court affirmed termination, reviewing whether (1) the Department provided all "necessary services" and (2) the trial court made a permissible finding of current parental unfitness.
- The majority held additional services (family therapy; attachment/bonding therapy) were not required because they were not reasonably available or would have been futile and could not remedy the severed bond within the child’s "foreseeable future." A concurring opinion agreed with the result but criticized the Department’s failure to provide timely reunification/attachment services.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (J.M.) | Defendant's Argument (Department) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) required the Department to provide family therapy and attachment/bonding services | Department failed to provide necessary services (family therapy; attachment/bonding) that addressed the condition precluding reunification | Those services were not reasonably available or appropriate because reunification was never underway and family therapy is offered after individual issues are addressed | Court held services were not required: family therapy was not reasonably available and attachment services would have been futile |
| Whether attachment/bonding services would have been futile | Such services could have repaired the bond if offered timely; futility not established because J.M. was willing and had completed other services | Services would be futile because K.M.M. refused contact, therapy would require child participation, and father’s mental health and lack of insight made benefit unlikely | Court held futility established: child refusal, risk of emotional harm, and father’s limitations made services ineffective within foreseeable future |
| Proper scope of "current parental unfitness" inquiry | Unfitness must focus on parent only; considering child-specific attachment improperly blends best-interests analysis into unfitness | Unfitness may consider the parent–child relationship and child-specific conditions that prevent reunification | Court held unfitness may include the totality of the parent–child relationship; J.M. was currently unfit because he could not parent this particular child given the severed attachment |
| Whether termination was in the child’s best interests | (Not directly contested on appeal) father contended some error in service provision undercuts termination | Department argued termination served child’s need for stability and permanence | Court affirmed trial court’s best-interests finding (child’s need for permanency, experts’ testimony that continued dependency would harm development) |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Welfare of C.S., 168 Wn.2d 51 (2010) (services needed to address conditions that preclude reunification are "necessary services")
- In re Welfare of A.B., 168 Wn.2d 908 (2010) (two-step termination framework: statutory elements then best interests)
- In re Dependency of K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d 918 (1999) (standard of review and burden of proof in termination cases)
- In re Welfare of Aschauer, 93 Wn.2d 689 (1980) (considering parent’s ability to meet a child's specific needs in unfitness analysis)
- In re Welfare of Hall, 99 Wn.2d 842 (1983) (deference to trial court in fact-specific termination decisions)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (due process requires finding of current unfitness before termination)
- In re Welfare of Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736 (1973) (clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard requires facts be highly probable)
- In re Parental Rights to B.P., 186 Wn.2d 292 (2016) (futility doctrine and necessity of services; reversal where necessary services were not provided)