108 A.3d 294
Del. Ch.2015Background
- New Maurice J. Moyer Academic Institute ("New Moyer"), a Wilmington charter school serving grades 6–12, received a four‑year charter beginning 2012–13 that expired June 2016. The Delaware Department of Education (Department) placed New Moyer on Formal Review in July 2014 and revoked its charter effective June 30, 2015.
- The Department cited four grounds for revocation: (i) academic performance (lowest‑performing charter in the State in 2013–14), (ii) failures in special education services (numerous noncompliant IEPs), (iii) educational programming (curriculum deficiencies and unsuccessful modification requests), and (iv) discipline/attendance problems.
- New Moyer (the operator), several parents of students, and the City of Wilmington sued, seeking a preliminary injunction to block the revocation and closure and alleging due process and related claims. The Court consolidated actions and heard expedited briefing and argument.
- The Court found that the Charter School Act gives the Department discretionary authority to revoke a charter once statutory triggers are met, and that the statutory review procedures (Formal Review, Committee hearings, written responses, and public Department/State Board hearing) were followed.
- The Court concluded New Moyer and the parent plaintiffs lacked constitutionally protected property interests in the charter or in graduating from a particular school, and, even assuming such interests, the procedures afforded satisfied due process under Mathews v. Eldridge.
- The Court also held the Charter School Act bars judicial review of the merits of a Department revocation decision but impliedly permits review limited to whether the Department acted "after the exercise of due diligence and good faith;" the record did not make it reasonably probable New Moyer could prove a lack of due diligence or bad faith.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether New Moyer has a constitutionally protected property interest in its charter | Charter is a government license entitling New Moyer to procedural due process | Revocation/renewal decisions are discretionary under the Charter School Act, so no entitlement exists | No protected property interest; Department’s revocation discretion precludes constitutionally protected entitlement |
| Whether students (Choice Program) have a property interest to remain/enroll through graduation | Section 407(a)(1) grants a student the right to remain until graduation, so students have a protected property interest | Section 407 protections presuppose a school remains open; Charter School Act allows revocation, so no standalone right to graduate from a particular school | No protected property interest in graduating from a particular school under the Choice statute |
| Whether Department’s process violated procedural due process (notice & opportunity to be heard) | Notice on website was deficient; hearings in Dover limited plaintiffs’ ability to introduce evidence and examine witnesses | Statutorily prescribed process (Formal Review, Committee hearings, written responses, public hearings) provided adequate notice and opportunity; Mathews balancing permits flexible procedures | Procedures satisfied due process; no reasonable probability plaintiffs will prevail on procedural due process claim |
| Whether statutory requirements/procedures (timing and effective date) were violated and entitled plaintiffs to relief | Revocation letter was sent 61 working days after Formal Review (exceeding 60‑day deadline); revocation should have been immediate | 60‑day requirement is not shown to be jurisdictional/mandatory; revocation can be effective at future date; any one‑day delay was not prejudicial | Even assuming a technical timing issue, one‑day delay is hypertechnical without prejudice; Department permissibly made revocation effective at end of school year |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (framework for balancing private interest, risk of erroneous deprivation, and government interest in procedural due process)
- Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (property interests for due process purposes are created by state law and require a legitimate claim of entitlement)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (notice and an opportunity to respond are fundamental procedural due process requirements)
- Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (statutory language that limits official discretion can create a protected expectancy)
- Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State University, 227 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 2000) (substantive due process protects only fundamental rights; novelty is insufficient)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (substantive due process for executive action requires conduct that "shocks the conscience")
- Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (caution against extending substantive due process rights absent clear historical roots)