In Re the Marriage of Chamberlin
2011 MT 253
| Mont. | 2011Background
- Ed and Trina married in August 2006 in Crestwell, Oregon, and separated in August 2009 with one child, G.S.C., born August 2007.
- Ed purchased Townsend, Montana property in 2003 with a claimed $25,000 loan from his father, documented by an undated note; Ed did not make payments on the loan.
- In 2007 the parties obtained a home equity loan and used proceeds to pay off Trina's car and student loans; in 2009 they refinanced their mortgage, consolidating debts in both names.
- The District Court issued an October 21, 2010 dissolution decree: Ed received the Townsend property; Trina received her Ford Focus; a parenting plan awarded Trina primary custody of G.S.C.; Ed allegedly constrained Trina's parenting time.
- Ed appealed the division of the marital estate, the parenting plan awarding primary custody to Trina, and the potential for attorney-fee awards to Trina.
- The court upheld the District Court’s decisions, including property division and Trina’s primary custody, and rejected the argument to remand for attorney-fee awards beyond noting potential sanctions appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equitable division of the marital estate | Chamberlin contends Townsend should be a marital liability/should credit his $25,000 loan. | Chamberlin argues the loan was informal and not a liability; property should be divided with consideration of pre-marital acquisition and contributions by Trina. | District Court did not abuse discretion; property division affirmed. |
| Primary parenting of the child, G.S.C. | Ed asserts he lived with G.S.C. more during separation and should be primary residential parent. | Trina alleges Ed used intimidation and restricted contact; best interests favored Trina as primary parent. | District Court’s primary custody to Trina supported by evidence and best interests. |
| Attorney fees and costs on appeal | Trina sought an award of attorney fees against Ed. | Ed’s appeal lacks abuse of discretion or good faith justification for fees; sanctions considered but not warranted as to fees on appeal. | No remand for fees; sanctions for frivolous appeal not warranted beyond potential general appellate sanctions. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Marriage of Kessler, 359 Mont. 419 (2011 MT 54) (applies abuse of discretion standard in property divisions)
- Harper v. Harper, 994 P.2d 1 (1999 MT 321) (discretion in property distribution under § 40-4-402, MCA)
- Bartsch v. Bartsch, 162 P.3d 72 (2007 MT 136) (presumption of correctness for district court property division)
- Sian v. Kooyer, 239 P.3d 121 (2010 MT 178) (custody standards; abuse of discretion review in parenting plans)
- In re Marriage of Rolf, 16 P.3d 345 (2000 MT 361) (evidence-based approach to valuing contributed property and premarital interests)
- Cooper v. Glaser, 228 P.3d 443 (2010 MT 55) (frivolous appeal standards and good faith considerations)
