In re the Marriage of: Priscilla Diane Herr and Shizuo Yamada
34227-1
| Wash. Ct. App. | Nov 9, 2017Background
- Yamada and Herr signed a 1986 prenuptial agreement in California before marrying; it granted Herr sole ownership of her earnings and required Yamada to support her during the marriage. Yamada did not consult counsel before signing.
- The parties later signed two declarations (1987, 1992) allocating debts and acknowledging the prenup; they mostly kept finances separate.
- Herr moved to Washington in 1995; substantial property transactions (Washington real estate purchases and later sales) occurred after the prenup.
- Herr petitioned for dissolution in Franklin County, WA (2013); the trial court bifurcated proceedings to first decide enforceability of the financial documents and the prenup.
- The trial court found the prenup “amateurish” and that Yamada lacked counsel (procedural concern) but concluded the agreement was not substantially unfair at inception and enforced it; community property division largely followed the prenup. Yamada appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Herr) | Defendant's Argument (Yamada) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Choice of law for prenup validity | Apply Washington law (parties requested it) | CA law might govern because agreement executed in CA and defines community property by CA law | Court applied Washington law (parties asked trial court to use WA; no manifest injustice; court not required to sua sponte apply CA law) |
| Burden of proof in written findings | Not contested; court orally stated clear, cogent, convincing standard | Trial court erred by failing to state burden in written findings | No error; CR 52 did not require stating burden in written findings; oral notice sufficed |
| Substantive fairness of prenup | Agreement was fair or at least not substantively oppressive given parties’ circumstances | Agreement was one‑sided and therefore substantively unfair and invalid | Agreement was not substantively unfair at execution (favored economically weaker spouse); enforced |
| Procedural fairness / counsel absence | Long acquiescence and other facts support voluntariness despite no counsel | Lack of counsel and imbalance require scrutiny; trial court insufficiently addressed procedural fairness | Majority: procedural concerns noted but unnecessary after substantive fairness finding; dissent: remand needed for clearer findings on procedural fairness |
Key Cases Cited
- McKee v. AT&T Corp., 164 Wn.2d 372 (contract choice‑of‑law principle)
- Erwin v. Cotter Health Ctrs., Inc., 161 Wn.2d 676 (application of foreign law and pleading requirements)
- In re Marriage of Bernard, 165 Wn.2d 895 (two‑step prenuptial analysis: substantive then procedural fairness)
- In re Marriage of Matson, 107 Wn.2d 479 (substantive/procedural fairness framework for prenups)
- In re Marriage of DewBerry, 115 Wn. App. 351 (prenups governed by contract principles; public policy favoring enforcement)
- Estate of Crawford, 107 Wn.2d 493 (scrutiny where agreement contains no provision for one spouse)
- In re Marriage of Foran, 67 Wn. App. 242 (importance of independent advice; totality of circumstances for procedural fairness)
- Kolmorgan v. Schaller, 51 Wn.2d 94 (burden on proponent to prove factual issues by clear and convincing evidence in certain contexts)