In re the Marriage of: Lane Lehman and Cynthia Lehman
33868-1
| Wash. Ct. App. | Mar 14, 2017Background
- Lane and Cynthia Lehman divorced by agreed decree (May 2014); two children then ages 16 and 14; mother reserved right to seek postsecondary support.
- Cynthia (Lincoln) filed a modification petition one year later seeking postsecondary support and broader child-support changes; her supporting financial worksheet was filed late.
- Lane was served in Alabama; he hired Spokane attorney Mr. M., who handled communication poorly, failed to file required financial affidavit/worksheet, and did not notify Lane of filings, hearings, or his resignation from the firm.
- A commissioner heard the modification on September 24 largely without Lane’s active participation, issued orders (Oct. 1) granting most relief requested, and entered findings and a child-support worksheet that increased Lane’s payments substantially.
- Lane first saw the final orders Oct. 26, filed a timely appeal, and then moved to vacate under CR 60(b)(1) and (11), arguing he had been effectively excluded from participation due to his attorney’s conduct.
- The commissioner and superior court denied vacation under CR 60(b)(1); the appellate court affirmed that denial but remanded for additional findings on Lane’s CR 60(b)(11) claim and clarified the legal standard for attorney-caused deprivation of representation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lehman) | Defendant's Argument (Lincoln) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Were various non-postsecondary modifications valid without statutory basis? | Commissioner erred modifying younger-child support, payment schedule, automatic adjustments, and education-cost allocations beyond allowed reservation. | Issues were not preserved below; commissioner had jurisdiction and Lincoln’s filings supported relief. | Not reviewed on appeal — issues unpreserved. |
| 2. Was postsecondary support ordered without required statutory consideration and proper evidence? | RCW 26.19.090(6) factors were not adequately considered and child does not live with mother, so award improper. | Late filings and hearing waived objections; errors were for trial record correction, not CR 60 relief. | Not reviewed — unpreserved. |
| 3. CR 60(b)(1): Were there irregularities (notice, discovery, procedure) justifying vacatur? | Irregularities in notice and procedure (attorney’s failures) meant orders obtained by irregularity. | Attorney notice is notice to client; attorney negligence is imputed to client; no procedural rule was violated by court. | Denied — no abuse of discretion in refusing vacatur under CR 60(b)(1). |
| 4. CR 60(b)(11): Can orders be vacated because attorney’s conduct effectively deprived client of representation? | Mr. M’s gross negligence and secrecy effectively excluded Lane from participation; extraordinary relief under CR 60(b)(11) is warranted. | Barr limited to attorney condition; argue Haller rule (attorney acts bind client) applies and negligence is imputed to Lane. | Remanded for additional findings. Court clarified CR 60(b)(11) relief may be granted where attorney’s gross negligence effectively deprived a diligent but unknowing client of representation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Haller v. Wallis, 89 Wn.2d 539 (1978) (an attorney’s acts are generally binding on the client; negligence ordinarily imputed to client)
- Barr v. MacGugan, 119 Wn. App. 43 (2003) (CR 60(b)(11) relief allowed where attorney’s inaction effectively deprived a diligent but unknowing client of representation)
- Lane v. Brown & Haley, 81 Wn. App. 102 (1996) (irregularity defined as failure to adhere to prescribed mode of proceeding)
- White v. Holm, 73 Wn.2d 348 (1968) (vacatur proceedings are equitable; relief should preserve substantial rights and justice)
- Smith v. King, 106 Wn.2d 443 (1986) (absence of express findings on material factual issues is generally presumed against the proponent unless record shows otherwise)