In re the Interest of Jordan G.
2015 IL 116834
Ill.2015Background
- In April 2013 the State filed a juvenile petition charging 16-year-old Jordan G. with three counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (uncased/loaded firearm, under-21 handgun possession, no FOID) and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF) for being under 18.
- Jordan moved to dismiss, relying on the Seventh Circuit’s Moore v. Madigan holding that a blanket public-carry ban violates the Second Amendment; the trial court dismissed the AUUW counts and kept the UPF count.
- The State sought reconsideration; during the appeal this court issued People v. Aguilar, holding the Class 4 form of AUUW (uncased, loaded, immediately accessible firearm outside home) facially unconstitutional as a blanket public-carry ban.
- The trial court nonetheless held that the under-21 and FOID-based AUUW provisions were also unconstitutional; the State appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.
- The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed dismissal only as to the Class 4 (uncased/loaded/accessible) AUUW provision, reversed dismissal of the under-21 and FOID provisions, held those provisions severable, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Class 4 AUUW provision (uncased, loaded, immediately accessible firearm outside home) is constitutional | Jordan: provision bans public carry and violates the Second Amendment | State: reasonable regulations allowed; not all carry restrictions are unconstitutional | Court: provision is a facially unconstitutional blanket ban (affirmed per Aguilar) |
| Whether the under-21 and FOID-based AUUW subsections are facially unconstitutional as implicating public-carry rights | Jordan: age and FOID elements effectively prohibit public carry by 18–20-year-olds and violate Heller/McDonald | State: those subsections regulate age and licensing and are independent, reasonable regulations subject to historical tradition | Court: subsections (a)(3)(C) (FOID) and (a)(3)(I) (under-21) are constitutional and severable from the invalid provision (reversed trial court dismissal) |
| Whether the invalid Class 4 provision is severable from the rest of the AUUW statute | Jordan: statute was enacted as an interrelated comprehensive scheme and cannot be severed | State: severability exists under the Statute on Statutes; remaining provisions are complete and executable | Court: severability applies; remaining subsections stand (relied on People v. Mosley) |
| Whether Aguilar’s facial invalidation should be limited when applied to delinquent minors (as-applied) | State: delinquent minors (probation violators) are not law-abiding citizens and prohibiting them from possessing firearms should be constitutional | Jordan: (implied) Aguilar’s facial holding bars enforcement of the invalidated provision against him | Court: declined to revisit Aguilar; the facial invalidation stands and court did not decide broader as-applied question re: adjudicated delinquents |
Key Cases Cited
- Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (held blanket public-carry ban unconstitutional)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms for lawful purposes, including self-defense)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporated Second Amendment against the states)
- People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116 (Ill. 2013) (held Class 4 AUUW provision facially unconstitutional as a comprehensive ban on public carry)
- People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872 (Ill. 2015) (held under-21 and FOID subsections constitutional and severable from the invalidated Class 4 provision)
- Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (adopted two-step framework for Second Amendment analysis; textual/historical inquiry followed by means-ends scrutiny when appropriate)