In re the Estate of Weidner
2016 IL App (4th) 160306
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- James Gregory (Greg) Peters was born in 1967; his parents Ron and Patricia divorced and Ron later married Betty (Betty Jean Peters). Greg lived with Betty and Ron intermittently and participated in Weidner family life for decades.
- In 1988 Evelyn and Lyle Weidner created trusts and Evelyn executed a will providing distributions to Betty or, if she was not living, to her "descendants, per stirpes." Those instruments contain no explicit exclusion of adopted children.
- Evelyn died in 1989. In 1990 Betty (age 47) adopted Greg (age 22); the adoption file was sealed. Greg testified the adoption was motivated both by estate considerations and longstanding parent-child type relationship.
- Lyle’s later will (1996/1997) explicitly excluded Greg by name or limited the definition of descendants to certain categories, but the contested trusts were Evelyn’s and the joint Weidner trust whose language did not clearly exclude adoptees.
- Betty died in 2005 and Donna died in 2012; Greg did not receive distributions and sued, claiming entitlement as Betty’s descendant under the trusts. The trial court found Greg entitled to take; respondents appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an adopted adult (Greg) is treated as the adopting parent’s "descendant" under the trusts given the Probate Act presumption | Greg: Probate Act treats adoptees as children; trust language doesn’t clearly exclude adoptees, so he qualifies | Respondents: settlors intended to exclude Greg; extrinsic facts show contrary intent | Held: Statutory presumption applies; trust language fails to show contrary intent by clear and convincing evidence — Greg is a descendant |
| Whether extrinsic evidence (family history, Lyle’s will) rebuts the statutory presumption | Greg: extrinsic facts do not alter the clear statutory presumption or the trust text | Respondents: prior relationships and Lyle’s later exclusion show intent to omit Greg | Held: Rebuttal requires instrument terms showing settlor considered adoption contingency; respondents failed to meet that clear-and-convincing standard |
| Whether the adoption was a limited-use subterfuge done solely to obtain trust benefits | Greg: adoption reflected a genuine parent–child relationship and traditional parental motives as well as estate planning | Respondents: adoption of adult, timing after Evelyn’s probate, and testimony show sole motive of obtaining inheritance | Held: Court declines to apply subterfuge exception — record shows long-standing parental relationship and not solely for inheritance |
| Whether limited-use subterfuge exception should override statutory presumption and trust construction | Greg: exception inapplicable where adoption has substantial non-inheritance motives and family integration | Respondents: exception should apply to prevent thwarting settlors’ intent to keep assets in blood family | Held: Exception not invoked; allowing Greg to take does not contravene clear trust terms or proven settlor intent |
Key Cases Cited
- Cross v. Cross, 177 Ill. App. 3d 588 (1988) (adult adoption held subterfuge when done solely to make adoptee an heir)
- Dixon v. Weitekamp-Diller, 979 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. App. 2012) (limited-use subterfuge exception applied where adoptions served solely to capture trust benefits and thwart family-intent)
- First Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. King, 165 Ill. 2d 533 (1995) (to rebut adoptee presumption instrument must show testator considered adoption contingency)
- In re Estate of Roller, 377 Ill. App. 3d 572 (2007) (terms like "natural" or "heirs of the body" insufficient to exclude adopted children absent clear evidence)
- In re Estate of Brittin, 279 Ill. App. 3d 512 (1996) (adoptee attains status of natural child regardless of age at adoption)
- Continental Bank, N.A. v. Herguth, 248 Ill. App. 3d 292 (1993) (discusses scope of considering testator’s intent regarding adoptees)