In Re the Estate of Mills
2015 MT 245
| Mont. | 2015Background
- Decedent Howard H. Mills died June 21, 2014; his son Howard W. petitioned for formal probate and appointment as personal representative on August 21, 2014. Notices were mailed for a September 22, 2014 hearing.
- David (and brother John), both pro se and out-of-state, filed a September 8, 2014 letter objection (record shows certified-mail receipt) but did not file a formal timed objection by the court’s October 6 deadline after the court allowed 14 days post-hearing.
- Howard moved for entry of default under M. R. Civ. P. 55 for failure to object; the parties and court proceeded as if defaults were entered against John and David.
- David filed motions to set aside the default, arguing (1) the original minute entry omitted the 14-day extension and the amended entry came too late, and (2) the petition lacked a cause number under local rules.
- The District Court denied the motions, applying the three-factor "good cause" test (willfulness, prejudice, meritorious defense), found David’s conduct not excused and no meritorious defense shown, and admitted the will and appointed Howard as personal representative.
- The Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding the District Court slightly abused its discretion because David’s submissions indicated non-willful conduct and showed a meritorious defense (capacity/undue influence), so default should be set aside and the matter remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Howard's Argument | David's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion in denying motion to set aside default | Default appropriate: David failed to timely object, ignored deadlines, and lacked a meritorious defense; denial justified under willfulness/prejudice/meritorious-defense test | David timely demonstrated intent to contest via his Sept. 8 letter (certified-mail proof); not willful; raised capacity/undue influence concerns; technical defects (minute entry, cause number) excused nonconformity | Reversed: court slightly abused discretion — two of three good-cause factors (non-willfulness and meritorious defense) favor setting aside default; remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Engelsberger v. Lake Cnty., 339 Mont. 22, 167 P.3d 902 (Mont. 2007) (default-disfavoring policy; three-factor good-cause test for setting aside default)
- McClurg v. Flathead Cnty. Comm’rs, 188 Mont. 20, 610 P.2d 1153 (Mont. 1980) (district court discretion to set aside default should be liberally exercised to reach merits)
- Hall v. Hall, 380 Mont. 224, 354 P.3d 1224 (Mont. 2015) (Montana Supreme Court recently reversed defaults where pro se filings and procedural irregularities warranted relief)
- Essex Ins. Co. v. Jaycie, Inc., 323 Mont. 231, 99 P.3d 651 (Mont. 2004) (endorsing Engelsberger three-factor good-cause framework)
- In re Estate of Mead, 376 Mont. 386, 336 P.3d 362 (Mont. 2014) (contestants bear burden to prove undue influence)
- In re Estate of Lightfield, 351 Mont. 426, 213 P.3d 468 (Mont. 2009) (contestants must prove lack of testamentary capacity or other statutory grounds)