In re The Detention of White
2016 IL App (1st) 151187
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Phillip White, previously convicted of sexual and violent offenses (1980 attempted rape/robbery/battery; 1985 aggravated sexual assault; 1991 armed robbery), was the subject of a 2012 petition under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act; the State amended the petition to reflect DSM-5 diagnoses.
- The State alleged two DSM-5 diagnoses: other-specified paraphilic disorder (nonconsenting females) and other-specified personality disorder with antisocial features; experts testified these disorders, together, met the Act’s definition of a mental disorder that predisposes to sexual violence.
- Two State experts (Drs. Schechter and Smith) relied on offense details, records, actuarial instruments, and dynamic risk factors to diagnose White and opined he was substantially probable to reoffend; a defense expert (Dr. Sillitti) disagreed and found no substantial risk.
- White refused interview attempts by the State experts but was interviewed by his own expert; none of the experts concluded that antisocial personality disorder alone would qualify under the Act—each testified the disorders acted synergistically.
- The trial court denied White’s proposed special interrogatories (including one asking whether he suffered from the paraphilic disorder alone); the jury asked whether the qualifying disorder was paraphilic non-consent, was directed to continue deliberating, and ultimately found White to be a sexually violent person.
- White appealed, arguing (1) antisocial personality disorder cannot qualify as a mental disorder under the Act, (2) the court erred in refusing his special interrogatory, and (3) the evidence was insufficient because he showed no sexual misconduct in custody for decades.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (White) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a combination of DSM conditions (paraphilia + antisocial features) may satisfy the Act’s definition of "mental disorder" | The two diagnoses together constitute a condition affecting emotional/volitional capacity and thus satisfy the Act | Antisocial personality disorder does not qualify as a mental disorder under the Act; commitment cannot be based on it or on a combination that includes it | Affirmed: The Act’s plain language requires a "condition" and does not prohibit combined disorders; the experts testified the two disorders worked synergistically to meet the statute |
| Whether the trial court erred by refusing a special interrogatory asking if respondent suffered from the paraphilic disorder alone | The State argued multiple disorders were alleged; a single-disorder interrogatory would be incomplete/misleading | White argued the interrogatory was needed to test the general verdict and could have produced an inconsistent finding | Affirmed: The special interrogatory was incomplete/misleading because the State presented evidence that both disorders together satisfied the Act; a negative answer would not be irreconcilable with the general verdict |
| Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove (beyond a reasonable doubt) mental disorder and substantial probability of reoffense | The State relied on offense details, expert diagnoses, actuarial and dynamic risk factors to prove both elements | White contended the State relied improperly on prior convictions and pointed to decades without sexual misconduct in custody | Affirmed: Experts may rely on offense behavior and records; evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State was sufficient to prove mental disorder and substantial probability |
Key Cases Cited
- McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2010) (discusses role of psychiatric diagnosis and factfinder’s assessment when determining legal "mental disorder" in SVP commitments)
- Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (recognizes states’ leeway in defining conditions for civil commitment of dangerous sexual offenders)
- In re State, 21 N.E.3d 239 (N.Y. 2014) (addresses whether antisocial personality disorder qualifies as a mental disorder under a state SVP statute)
- In re Commitment of Adams, 588 N.W.2d 336 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (interprets "mental disorder" to include personality disorders under state commitment statute)