In Re The Detention Of Alma Mcgowan, 74301-5

Background

A.M., diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, was placed on an initial agreed 14‑day involuntary hold after combative behavior when first found unconscious and during hospital intake.
Fairfax Hospital petitioned to extend involuntary inpatient treatment for 90 days under RCW 71.05.280(1), alleging she had threatened others while in custody and, due to mental disorder, presented a likelihood of serious harm.
Dr. Cynthia Mason (clinical psychologist) testified based on chart review, staff discussions, and observations; A.M. refused direct evaluation.
Record contained numerous threats and delusional statements by A.M. toward staff (e.g., “I will kill you,” “I am trained to kill”), but no evidence staff were actually fearful, and A.M. had not physically assaulted anyone nor required restraints, seclusion, or forced medication at Fairfax.
Trial court found by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that A.M., after being taken into custody, threatened others and, because of her mental disorder, presented a likelihood of serious harm, and ordered a 90‑day commitment.
Court of Appeals reversed, holding the State failed to prove that any specific person was placed in reasonable fear of sustaining physical harm as required by the statutory definition of “likelihood of serious harm.”

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether there was sufficient evidence that A.M., after being taken into custody, presented a likelihood of serious harm to others	A.M. argued the evidence was insufficient because no specific person testified they were placed in reasonable fear by her threats	The State argued the person in fear need not be the target; any person "privy to the threat" or a generalized public fear suffices, and concern about potential future violence supports commitment	Reversed: statute requires that a specific person or persons be placed in reasonable fear of sustaining harm; generalized or hypothetical fear of unspecified others is insufficient
Whether the evidence of threatening statements and delusions, absent proof of others’ fear or prior assaults, supports a 90‑day commitment	A.M. contended threats alone, without evidence that specific persons were actually placed in reasonable fear, do not meet the statutory standard	State maintained that threats and clinical opinion about potential danger justified commitment to protect public safety	Held: Threats alone are insufficient without evidence that particular persons were placed in reasonable fear; commitment reversed
Proper construction of RCW 71.05.020(27)(a)(ii) ("reasonable fear")	A.M. urged a strict reading requiring actual fear by identifiable persons	State urged a broader construction to allow preventative detention when threats indicate risk to unspecified persons	Held: Statutory language unambiguous; must be strictly construed for involuntary treatment—requires fear by "another person or persons," i.e., identifiable persons
Reliance on precedent permitting preventive detention or detention when target unaware	A.M. argued Williams and other cases do not support detention absent an identified, fearful target	State relied on State v. Williams and policy arguments about preventing future violence	Held: Williams is distinguishable (there the threatened target was identified and fearful); policy arguments cannot overcome the clear statutory text requiring identifiable persons in fear

Key Cases Cited

In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196 (recognizes burden of proof for 90‑day commitment is clear, cogent, and convincing)
In re Pet. of W.C.C., 193 Wn. App. 783 (upheld commitment where threats and assaults placed identified staff/residents in reasonable fear)
State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197 (distinguishable; threatened target was identified and testified to fearing the threat)
In re Pet. of D.W., 181 Wn.2d 201 (involuntary treatment statute impacts liberty and must be strictly construed)
State v. Hansen, 122 Wn.2d 712 (statutory interpretation principles)