In Re The Dependency Of S.e.r., Kizzy Reid v. Dshs, 78770-5

In Nov. 2016 Reid was found asleep at an airport with her daughter S.E.R. unbuckled in a stroller; police arrested Reid on outstanding warrants and DSHS took the child into protective custody.
DSHS filed a dependency petition and provided Reid notice; Reid did not appear at the initial dependency hearing and the court entered a default dependency order in Jan. 2017 requiring services (treatment, UA testing, parenting classes, psychological evaluation) and visitation.
Reid never appealed or moved to vacate the default dependency order; subsequent review and permanency orders (Apr., Sept., Mar. 2017–2018) repeatedly identified S.E.R. as dependent under RCW 13.34.030(6).
DSHS filed a termination petition in Dec. 2017; a two-day termination hearing occurred in June 2018 where Reid testified but had not completed required services.
The trial court found the statutory termination elements proven (RCW 13.34.180(1)(a)–(f)) by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the child’s best interest; it entered an order terminating Reid’s parental rights in July 2018.
On appeal Reid contends the underlying dependency order is void because it contains internal inconsistencies (saying it was both a default and by agreement); she did not challenge personal or subject-matter jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Reid)	Defendant's Argument (State/DSHS)	Held
Validity of dependency order (void vs voidable)	The dependency order is void due to internal inconsistencies (states both default and agreement).	The court had jurisdiction; inconsistencies at most render the order voidable, not void.	Order is not void; inconsistencies make it voidable only, so collateral attack fails.
Ability to collaterally attack dependency order	Termination should be invalid if underlying dependency order is void.	A collateral attack is allowed only if the judgment is void; Reid did not challenge jurisdiction and waited too long to vacate.	Collateral attack barred—Reid failed to timely seek vacatur; dependency stands for termination purposes.
Sufficiency of evidence for termination statutory prongs	State failed to prove dependency prerequisite because dependency order is invalid.	Evidence (including Reid’s testimony and prior findings/orders) meets RCW 13.34.180 elements by clear and convincing evidence.	Statutory elements and best-interest showing satisfied; termination affirmed.
Manifest constitutional error / due process	Dependency order’s defects amounted to a due-process violation constituting manifest constitutional error.	No actual prejudice shown; Reid received notice, did not dispute underlying facts, and testimony at termination aligned with those findings.	No manifest constitutional error; Reid fails to show actual prejudice.

In re Dependency of K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d 568, 257 P.3d 522 (Wash. 2011) (distinguishes void vs voidable dependency orders and when jurisdictional defects permit collateral attack)
Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wn.2d 241, 543 P.2d 325 (Wash. 1975) (judgment void only if court lacked jurisdiction over parties or subject matter)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (due-process balancing test for procedural protections)
State v. 1NWJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d 595, 980 P.2d 1257 (Wash. 1999) (standard for showing actual prejudice in claims of manifest error)
Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 828 P.2d 549 (Wash. 1992) (court will not consider appellate arguments unsupported by record reference)