In re the Commitment of Black
2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 2224
| Tex. App. | 2017Background
- Stephen Black was civilly committed as a "sexually violent predator" after a jury trial; the court admitted prior criminal judgments including convictions for indecency with a child and burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault.
- Black’s burglary conviction judgment recites he pled nolo contendere to entering a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault; experts and Black testified the burglary was charged and convicted as intent to commit sexual assault.
- The State moved for a partial directed verdict that Black is a "repeat sexually violent offender" as defined in Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.003(b) (convicted of more than one sexually violent offense and sentence imposed for at least one).
- Black opposed, arguing (1) evidence exists that he lacked actual intent to commit sexual assault when burglarizing and (2) chapter 841 grants a jury the right to decide whether he was convicted of multiple sexually violent offenses (i.e., the directed verdict violated his statutory jury right).
- The trial court granted the directed verdict on the repeat-offender issue, instructed the jury that Black had been convicted of more than one sexually violent offense and thus was a repeat offender, and the jury found Black is a sexually violent predator.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Black) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether directed verdict on "repeat sexually violent offender" was improper | There was more-than-scintilla evidence he lacked intent to commit sexual assault during the burglary; jury must decide intent | Statute requires proving convictions, not re-proving actual criminal intent; convictions conclusively establish the fact for commitment | Directed verdict proper — convictions alone satisfy §841.003(b); no probative evidence to contrary |
| Whether chapter 841’s jury-right bars directed verdict under Tex. R. Civ. P. 268 | Chapter 841 grants a right to jury trial on commitment issues, so the jury should decide the repeat-offender fact | Directed verdict is a civil-procedure tool and does not infringe jury right when no factual dispute exists | Chapter 841 does not preclude a directed verdict on undisputed facts; directed verdict does not violate the statutory jury right |
Key Cases Cited
- Ibarra v. Nat’l Constr. Rentals, Inc., 199 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006) (standard for reviewing directed verdict/legal sufficiency)
- Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. 2011) (view evidence in light most favorable to nonmovant)
- Hoskins v. Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. 2016) (statutory construction: plain text governs)
- In re Commitment of Eeds, 254 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2008) (civil commitment proceeding cannot be used to collaterally attack criminal conviction)
- In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 543 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2015) (directed verdict consistent with jury right where facts are undisputed)
- Adams v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 1 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1928) (no jury right when no controverted issue of fact)