in Re: The Commitment of Terry Hornbuckle, 02-20-00308-CV

Terry Hornbuckle, a former pastor, had three convictions for drugging and raping separate women; he denied wrongdoing and claimed consent.
The State also presented evidence of four similar, unadjudicated sexual assaults; two indictments were dismissed.
At trial the State offered two experts (Dr. Proctor, Dr. Arambula) who opined Hornbuckle has a "behavioral abnormality" making him likely to commit predatory sexual violence; defense presented Dr. Marisa Mauro who disagreed.
The jury credited the State's experts, found Hornbuckle to be an SVP, and the trial court ordered civil commitment under Tex. Health & Safety Code ch. 841.
Hornbuckle appealed raising: (1) insufficiency of evidence on the statutory behavioral-abnormality element, (2) insufficiency regarding "serious difficulty controlling behavior" (a Crane-based, nonstatutory claim), and (3) constitutionality of the statute for failing to define "likely" for the jury.

Issue	Hornbuckle's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence that Hornbuckle has a "behavioral abnormality" making him likely to commit predatory sexual violence	Evidence legally and factually insufficient; State experts overstated actuarial risk and weight of factors	State experts were qualified, gave nonconclusory bases, and jury could credit them over defense expert	Affirmed: evidence legally and factually sufficient; jury credited State experts
Sufficiency re: "serious difficulty controlling behavior" (Crane issue)	Crane requires proof of serious difficulty controlling behavior as a separate constitutional element	Texas precedent (Stoddard) holds the statutory elements subsume Crane's concerns; no separate element required	Overruled: no separate sufficiency requirement; SVP statutory definition suffices
Constitutionality / jury instruction on undefined word "likely"	Statute unconstitutional for not defining "likely"; trial court should have defined it in the charge	Texas Supreme Court precedent rejects the constitutional challenge; "likely" is ordinary language intelligible to jurors; no charge definition required	Overruled: statute constitutional as written; no need to define "likely" in the jury charge

In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665 (Tex. 2020) (Texas Supreme Court on sufficiency and constitutionality of SVP statute)
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (due-process requirement that commitment statutes address lack-of-control concerns)
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (distinguishing civil commitment for sexual offenders by presence of serious mental disorder and lack of control)
Seger v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 503 S.W.3d 388 (Tex. 2016) (ordinary words need not be defined in jury charge)
City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2009) (treatment of unobjected-to expert testimony on sufficiency review)
In re Commitment of Dever, 521 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017) (holding SVP Act's definition of "behavioral abnormality" subsumes Crane inquiry)
Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (jurors may assign ordinary meanings to undefined statutory words)