in Re the Commitment of Santos Gomez III, 535 S.W.3d 917

Background

Santos Gomez III had multiple convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child; he reoffended while on probation. The trial court took judicial notice that these offenses are "sexually violent offenses" under chapter 841.
The State filed to civilly commit Gomez as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Tex. Health & Safety Code ch. 841; jury found him an SVP and the court ordered civil commitment.
The State’s expert (Dr. Thorne) and defense expert (Dr. McGarrahan) both evaluated Gomez using standard forensic methods: records review, interview, and actuarial instruments (PCL‑R, Static‑99R). Neither expert rendered a DSM‑V diagnosis.
Dr. Thorne scored Gomez 23 on the PCL‑R (moderate psychopathic traits), a 5 on Static‑99R (moderate‑high actuarial risk), diagnosed pedophilic disorder and assigned a DSM V V‑Code of adult antisocial behavior (not a formal DSM diagnosis), and concluded Gomez has a behavioral abnormality making him likely to commit predatory sexual violence.
Dr. McGarrahan scored Gomez 12 on PCL‑R and also a 5 on Static‑99R, disagreed that he would engage in predatory sexual violence, and did not diagnose him with pedophilia or antisocial personality disorder.
The trial court directed a partial verdict finding Gomez a repeat sexually violent offender; the jury then found him an SVP (thus implicitly finding a behavioral abnormality). Gomez appealed, challenging evidentiary sufficiency and admission of PCL‑R testimony.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Gomez)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether legal sufficiency requires a DSM‑V mental‑health diagnosis to prove "behavioral abnormality" under the SVP statute	A DSM‑V recognized diagnosis is required; none was made, so evidence insufficient	SVP statute does not require a formal DSM‑V diagnosis; experts may rely on accepted clinical methods and V‑codes	No DSM‑V diagnosis required; evidence legally sufficient to support SVP finding
Whether use of a V‑Code (adult antisocial behavior) created an analytical gap making Dr. Thorne's opinion unreliable	V‑Code is not a DSM diagnosis; relying on it leaves an analytical gap between data and opinion	Dr. Thorne used accepted methods, records, interviews, and actuarial tools; his opinion is reasoned judgment based on professional techniques	No improper analytical gap; Dr. Thorne’s opinion was reasoned and admissible
Whether PCL‑R testimony and testimony about psychopathic traits were irrelevant or improperly admitted because they did not yield a formal diagnosis	PCL‑R/traits testimony is irrelevant if it does not produce a diagnosis and thus should be excluded	SVP statute requires testing for psychopathy; PCL‑R and expert testimony about traits are relevant and permissible under the rules of evidence	Admission of PCL‑R and psychopathic‑trait testimony was not an abuse of discretion; relevant and permitted
Whether factual sufficiency was preserved on appeal	Gomez raised factual‑sufficiency claim on appeal	State noted procedural preservation requirements	Factual‑sufficiency challenge not preserved (no proper motion for new trial), so not reviewed

Key Cases Cited

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (U.S. 1997) (holding legal definitions in civil commitment need not match medical profession labels)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for legal‑sufficiency review beyond a reasonable doubt)
Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, 972 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1998) (expert testimony excluded where an analytical gap exists between data and opinion)
In re Commitment of Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. 2012) (discussion that medical diagnosis can inform but is not the dispositive issue in SVP proceedings)
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (jury may resolve conflicts and weigh credibility; appellate sufficiency review guidance)