In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia et, 741 F.3d 353

Background

Plaintiffs are victims, families, insurers, and property owners who suffered losses from the September 11, 2001 attacks and sued the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Saudi High Commission for Relief of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SHC).
Defendants invoked foreign sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA); plaintiffs invoked FSIA exceptions: the "terrorism exception" and the "tort exception."
The District Court dismissed claims against the Kingdom and SHC, finding the tort exception’s discretionary-function limitation excluded the plaintiffs’ claims and denied jurisdictional discovery.
The Second Circuit (Terrorist Attacks III) affirmed dismissal on a different ground: it held that when a tort is an act of terrorism, the tort exception cannot be used (so only the terrorism exception could apply), leaving the discretionary-function ruling unreviewed.
Later, the Court in Doe v. Bin Laden (mini‑en banc procedure) overruled Terrorist Attacks III, holding the tort exception may apply even when the tort is an act of terrorism, creating inconsistent outcomes between the cases.
Plaintiffs in Terrorist Attacks moved under Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen the judgment so the discretionary-function issue could be reviewed; the District Court denied the motion and this appeal followed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief is warranted to reopen judgment after intervening change in Circuit law	Rule 60(b)(6) relief is warranted because Bin Laden overruled Terrorist Attacks III, producing inconsistent outcomes for victims and preventing review of the District Court’s discretionary-function ruling	Denial of relief preserves finality; a change in decisional law alone is not extraordinary	Court reversed: extraordinary circumstances exist due to inconsistent treatment of co‑victims and unreviewed dispositive issue; Rule 60(b)(6) relief warranted
Whether an appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) can reach the merits of the original judgment	Plaintiffs contend reopening is necessary because an appeal from the denial cannot reach the unreviewed discretionary-function ruling	Defendants argued denial could be appealed and merits addressed	Court held appeal from denial reviews only denial itself, not underlying merits; District Court erred in assuming otherwise
Whether finality interests outweigh need for consistency among victims of same tort	Plaintiffs: finality must yield where justice requires consistent treatment of co‑victims	Defendants: finality of judgments should be respected; Rule 60(b) relief is exceptional	Court held consistency of victims (citing Gondeck) and procedural anomalies justify overcoming finality here
Whether the Court should decide discretionary-function, causation, or entire-tort issues on appeal now	Plaintiffs seek review of those merits if reopened	Defendants oppose merits review on Rule 60(b) appeal	Court declined to decide merits on appeal and remanded for District Court to consider these issues on remand

Key Cases Cited

Terrorist Attacks III v. Asat Trust Reg., 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008) (held tort exception unavailable for torts that are acts of terrorism)
Doe v. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (overruled Terrorist Attacks III; tort exception may apply even if tort is terrorism)
Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 382 U.S. 25 (1965) (finality yields where inconsistent treatment of similarly situated tort victims makes strict rules unfair)
United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien, 588 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2009) (denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief where cases arose from different incidents and only persuasive district-court authority conflicted)
Marrero Pichardo v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2004) (change in decisional law ordinarily is not an "extraordinary circumstance" for Rule 60(b)(6))
S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1998) (appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) reviews validity of denial, not merits of underlying judgment)