In Re: Terrence Wright v.
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11212
4th Cir.2016Background
- Terrence Leroy Wright, a North Carolina prisoner convicted of burglary and murder (sentenced 1996–1997), has repeatedly filed federal habeas petitions challenging various aspects of his custody and sentence administration.
- After an initial §2254 petition (2007) dismissed as untimely and subsequent frivolous petitions (2012, 2013), Wright filed a motion (2015) attaching a proposed petition styled as a §2241 challenge to the execution of his sentence.
- Wright’s proposed claims: (1) he should be treated under North Carolina’s Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), not the Structured Sentencing Act (SSA), entitling him to additional credit; (2) a South Carolina detainer prevents honor-grade/parole consideration; (3) application of the SSA constitutes an ex post facto violation; and (4) parole reviews occur every three years instead of annually, violating due process/equal protection.
- The court characterized these claims as challenges to the execution of Wright’s sentence (not to the validity of his convictions) but considered whether such petitions by state prisoners must nonetheless be treated as §2254 applications for purposes of AEDPA’s gatekeeping rules.
- The Fourth Circuit concluded that habeas petitions filed by state prisoners "pursuant to the judgment of a State court," even when styled as §2241 and challenging sentence execution, are governed by §2254 and thus fall within §2244(b)’s second-or-successive authorization regime.
- Wright did not show entitlement to the narrow §2244(b)(2) exceptions (new retroactive rule or factual predicate previously undiscoverable), and the court denied authorization to file the second/successive application.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a state prisoner’s challenge to execution of sentence styled under §2241 must meet §2244(b) authorization | Wright: his claims arise under §2241, so §2244(b) gatekeeping does not apply | State: petitions by prisoners "in custody pursuant to a State court judgment" are governed by §2254 and §2244(b) regardless of label | Court: Treats such petitions as §2254 "applications" for §2244(b) purposes; authorization required |
| Whether Wright’s proposed petition is "second or successive" and qualifies for §2244(b)(2) exceptions | Wright: not second/successive because he never before attacked execution of his sentence | State: Claims were available earlier and thus fall within abuse-of-the-writ principles; Wright makes no showing under §2244(b)(2) | Court: Petition is second/successive; Wright fails to satisfy §2244(b)(2) exceptions; authorization denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (AEDPA imposes new limits on habeas relief to state prisoners and recognizes §2254 as a limiting provision on §2241 authority)
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (meaning of "second or successive" must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged)
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (§2244(b) is not self-defining; look to pre-AEDPA doctrine for scope of second-or-successive limits)
- Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049 (11th Cir. 2003) (state-prisoner §2241 petitions subject to §2254 limitations to avoid circumvention of AEDPA)
- Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2001) (statutory interpretation favoring §2254 as limitation on §2241 to prevent evasion of AEDPA)
- Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2000) (focus on custody under state judgment means §2254 applies to execution challenges by state prisoners)
- Fontanez v. O’Brien, 807 F.3d 84 (4th Cir. 2015) (challenge to credit against sentence is an attack on execution, not on the sentence itself)