34 Cal. App. 5th 543
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- In 1994 Anthony Taylor was convicted as an aider and abettor of first‑degree felony murder for an attempted robbery in which co‑defendant Marzett Davis shot and killed employee Kathryn Cary; jury found the section 190.2(d) special circumstance (major participant + reckless indifference) true and sentenced Taylor to LWOP.
- Facts: Taylor helped plan the robbery, drove the getaway car, waited nearby while Davis approached the deposit box, heard shots, picked up Davis afterwards, and later told an accomplice “Fuck that old bitch.”
- At trial the prosecution emphasized Taylor’s role in planning, selection of Davis (who liked weapons), and post‑shooting flight/remarks to support reckless indifference and major‑participant findings.
- Taylor sought habeas relief after People v. Banks and People v. Clark clarified standards for when an aider/abettor may be found a major participant who acted with reckless indifference.
- The Court of Appeal reviewed the record (including trial transcripts) and applied Banks/Clark factors, focusing on planning, weapon knowledge, proximity/opportunity to prevent the killing, steps to minimize violence, and post‑offense conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Taylor) | Defendant's Argument (Attorney General) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether substantial evidence supports the section 190.2(d) special circumstance (major participant + reckless indifference) | Taylor: Banks/Clark require proof he knowingly created a grave risk of death when participating; post‑shooting indifference alone is insufficient | AG: Prior appellate ruling and superior court findings (relying on Taylor’s planning, recruitment of Davis, flight, and callous post‑shooting conduct) show substantial evidence | Vacated: Evidence does not show Taylor knowingly created a grave risk of death; post‑shooting indifference alone cannot establish reckless indifference under Banks/Clark |
| Whether Taylor’s habeas claim is procedurally barred or untimely | Taylor: Claim timely after Banks/Clark; habeas procedural bars do not foreclose relief under federal due process as explained in Fiore | AG: Claim was previously rejected on appeal, and is untimely after decades | Not barred: Court follows Miller/Ramirez reasoning; petition timely measured from Banks/Clark and Supreme Court’s order to show cause counselled consideration on merits |
| Whether post‑conviction relief under SB 1437 (and §1170.95) should be granted here or decided by trial court | Taylor: If special circumstance vacated, SB 1437 may require vacating felony‑murder conviction | AG: Did not fully address; procedural posture not briefed | Court: Declined to decide; directed Taylor to seek relief in superior court via §1170.95 petition so record/hearing can address resentencing |
| Proper role of post‑shooting conduct in Banks/Clark analysis | Taylor: Post‑shooting conduct cannot, standing alone, prove reckless indifference; must show knowing creation of grave risk during planning/commission | AG: Emphasized flight, failure to aid, and callous comment as evidence of indifference supporting the special circumstance | Court: Agreed with Taylor—post‑offense indifference is relevant but alone insufficient to prove the requisite mens rea under Banks/Clark |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (2015) (adopting Tison/Enmund spectrum for section 190.2(d) and listing nonexclusive factors to assess major‑participant and reckless‑indifference elements)
- People v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016) (clarifies reckless‑indifference requires awareness that defendant’s own actions created a grave risk of death and provides factors for analysis)
- Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (Supreme Court holding that major participation plus reckless indifference can satisfy Eighth Amendment culpability for non‑killer co‑participants)
- Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (Supreme Court holding death penalty unconstitutional for aider/abettor who neither killed, attempted to kill, nor intended that lethal force be used)
- Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001) (federal due process prohibits convicting under a criminal statute as properly interpreted when state court later clarifies that statute’s scope)