In re Taylor
60 Cal. 4th 1019
| Cal. | 2015Background
- In 2006 California voters enacted Proposition 83 ("Jessica's Law"), adding Penal Code §3003.5(b) to bar registered sex offenders on parole from residing within 2,000 feet of any public or private K–12 school or park where children regularly gather. CDCR enforced the restriction as a mandatory parole condition in San Diego County.
- More than 150 San Diego parolees challenged the statute as-applied; four representative petitioners (Taylor, Glynn, Briley, Todd) were litigated at an eight-day evidentiary hearing addressing housing availability, enforcement practice, and effects on parolees.
- Factual findings showed the 2,000-foot exclusion zones rendered roughly 97% of multifamily rental parcels unavailable in San Diego County; many parolees became transient or homeless and lost access to treatment, medical care, public transportation, and employment.
- CDCR policy limited officer assistance: parole agents were not permitted to direct parolees where to live; housing assistance was limited and temporary. Local enforcement practices and definitional ambiguities (e.g., “park”) varied across agents.
- Trial court found blanket enforcement of §3003.5(b) as a parole condition in San Diego County was "unconstitutionally unreasonable" as applied, enjoined CDCR from blanket enforcement but allowed individualized, discretionary residency conditions. The Court of Appeal affirmed; the Supreme Court of California affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether blanket enforcement of §3003.5(b) as a mandatory parole condition violates constitutional rights as applied in San Diego County | Blanket enforcement is unconstitutionally unreasonable: it effectively banishes parolees from most housing, increases homelessness, and infringes liberty/privacy, travel, and family association rights | Parolees have diminished liberty while on supervised parole; the restriction furthers a legitimate interest in protecting children and should be reviewed under rational basis | Held unconstitutional as applied in San Diego County: even under rational-basis review the blanket enforcement bears no rational relationship to public-safety goals because it increases homelessness and impedes supervision/rehabilitation |
| Appropriate standard of review for parolees' liberty claims | Petitioners urged heightened scrutiny because intrastate travel, home, and privacy are fundamental rights | CDCR urged deferential review (rational basis) because parole limits liberty significantly | Court assumed the issue but resolved in favor of petitioners under the more deferential rational-basis test — statute fails even that standard as applied |
| Effect of enforcement practices and CDCR policy (agent assistance, definitions, waivers) | CDCR's enforcement practices (no agent guidance, limited housing aid, vague definitions) caused arbitrary, oppressive results and exacerbated harm | CDCR defended its policies as consistent with statute and parole supervisory practice | Court relied on enforcement record; arbitrary and rigid implementation contributed to constitutional infirmity of blanket enforcement |
| Availability of alternate remedies / CDCR authority after injunction | Petitioners sought countywide relief from blanket mandatory condition | CDCR argued it must enforce statutory residency restriction as written | Court affirmed injunction against blanket enforcement but confirmed CDCR retains statutory authority to impose individualized discretionary parole conditions, including targeted residency restrictions based on particularized circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- In re E.J., 47 Cal.4th 1258 (2010) (remanded as-applied challenges for evidentiary hearings)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolees have diminished but not extinguished liberty interests)
- Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (framework for fundamental-rights/strict-scrutiny analysis)
- Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (rational-basis standard when fundamental-right threshold not met)
- Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (prefer as-applied adjudication to avoid broad facial rulings)
- In re Stevens, 119 Cal.App.4th 1228 (2004) (parole conditions must not be arbitrary or oppressive)