In re: Tadd Vassell v.
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 8500
| 4th Cir. | 2014Background
- Tadd Vassell was convicted in 1997 of conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances and sentenced under mandatory Guidelines to life without parole; sentence imposed before Booker made Guidelines discretionary.
- The conspiracy ran from Dec 1990 to Aug 1992; Vassell was 17 at the start and turned 18 during the conspiracy (court assumed, without deciding, he qualifies as a juvenile for discussion).
- Vassell filed multiple § 2255 motions and requests for successive relief; all were denied or dismissed prior to this application.
- After Miller v. Alabama (2012), Vassell filed a § 2255(h) application (within one year of Miller) seeking authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion claiming Miller announced a new retroactive rule applicable to him.
- Government conceded Miller announced a new retroactive rule but argued Vassell’s claim was governed by Graham (2010) because Graham forbids life-without-parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders; if Graham controlled, Vassell’s claim is time-barred under § 2255(f)(3).
- The Fourth Circuit denied authorization, holding Miller did not newly expand rights for nonhomicide juvenile offenders and that Graham, decided in 2010, was the operative precedent, making Vassell’s proposed claim untimely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller furnishes a new rule that authorizes a successive § 2255 for a juvenile nonhomicide offender | Miller broadly bars mandatory life-without-parole for all juveniles, so it supplies a new rule applicable to Vassell | Miller’s novelty applies to homicide cases; for nonhomicide juvenile offenders Graham already barred life-without-parole | Held: Miller did not create a new right for nonhomicide juvenile offenders; Graham is the controlling precedent |
| Whether the proposed successive § 2255 motion is timely under § 2255(f)(3) | Filing within one year of Miller is timely | Right was initially recognized in Graham (2010), so the one-year limitations period expired before Vassell filed in 2013 | Held: Claim would be time-barred because Graham (2010) is the initial recognition date |
| Whether the court may consider timeliness at the authorization stage | Too premature to decide statute of limitations at gatekeeping; authorization should focus only on prima facie showing | Court may consider timeliness to avoid futile authorization when the legal record clearly shows untimeliness | Held: Court may consider timeliness when the record and law allow resolution as a matter of law; here it did so |
| Whether Miller’s language should be read to restart limitations for nonhomicide claims | Miller’s broad phrasing supports restarting the clock | Miller explicitly distinguished Graham’s flat ban for nonhomicides from Miller’s individualized-sentencing rule for homicides | Held: Miller did not restart the limitations period for nonhomicide claims; Graham remains the relevant initial-date decision |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (held mandatory life-without-parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment; announced individualized-sentencing rule for homicide)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (held life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (declared death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile offenders; recognized diminished culpability of youth)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (held Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory, not mandatory)
- Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006) (procedural protections required before dismissing habeas claims as time-barred)