In Re: Steele v. Appeal of: Steele, V.
177 A.3d 328
Pa. Super. Ct.2017Background
- Warren General Hospital filed an emergency guardianship petition for Victoria A. Steele on Nov. 1, 2016; HelpMates, Inc. was appointed emergency guardian after hearings on Nov. 7 and Nov. 29, 2016.
- Hospital filed a petition for appointment of a permanent guardian (amended Nov. 30, 2016); Steele was served in late November 2016.
- Steele filed a written Request for a Hearing Before a Jury on Dec. 14, 2016 (12 days before a Dec. 26/21 hearing date), and renewed it after continuances; the hearing ultimately occurred Jan. 9, 2017.
- The orphans’ court initially denied Steele’s jury demand as untimely under 20 Pa.C.S. § 777(d) (requiring written demand at least 10 days before the "initial hearing").
- The court appointed a permanent guardian on Jan. 9–10, 2017, then vacated its interim reinstatement of the jury right on Jan. 25, 2017, concluding Steele’s demand was untimely because the initial hearing was Nov. 29, 2016.
- Steele appealed, claiming she timely demanded a jury (more than 10 days before the ultimately held hearing), and the Superior Court reversed, holding her § 777 demand was timely as made more than ten days before the initial hearing that actually occurred (after continuance).
Issues
| Issue | Steele's Argument | Hospital's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Steele waived the statutory right to a jury under 20 Pa.C.S. § 777(d) | Steele argued her written demand (Dec. 14, 2016, and renewed Dec. 28) was timely because it was made more than 10 days before the hearing actually held (Jan. 9, 2017) | Hospital argued the demand was untimely because § 777(d) requires demand at least 10 days before the "initial hearing," here scheduled Nov. 29, 2016 | Court held Steele did not waive the jury: her demand was timely as made more than 10 days before the initial hearing that occurred after continuance (Jan. 9, 2017) |
| Interpretation of "initial hearing" in § 777(d) when hearings are continued | Steele contended "initial hearing" should be read to allow a timely demand before the first hearing that actually takes place (post-continuance) | Hospital and trial court read "initial hearing" to mean the first scheduled hearing date on the petition (even if continued) | Court interpreted the statute by plain language and purpose: where a hearing is continued, a demand made more than 10 days before the hearing that actually takes place satisfies § 777(d) |
Key Cases Cited
- Veloric v. Doe, 123 A.3d 781 (Pa. Super. 2015) (discussing appealability and final order rules)
- K.H. v. J.R., 825 A.2d 863 (Pa. 2003) (single notice of appeal can secure review of prior non-final orders made final by a subsequent final order)
- Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 44 A.3d 27 (Pa. 2012) (same principle for appellate review of non-final orders made final)
- In re Estate of Miller, 18 A.3d 1163 (Pa. Super. 2011) (failure to comply with § 777(d) timing constitutes waiver of jury right)
- Commonwealth v. McFadden, 156 A.3d 299 (Pa. Super. 2017) (statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo)
- Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 850 A.2d 1268 (Pa. Super. 2004) (standard of review for statutory application)
- Commonwealth v. Merolla, 909 A.2d 337 (Pa. Super. 2006) (use of Statutory Construction Act guidance)
- Commonwealth v. Bradley, 834 A.2d 1127 (Pa. 2003) (plain language of a statute is best evidence of legislative intent)