In RE STATE OF TEXAS v. the State of Texas, 602 S.W.3d 549

The case arises from a dispute over whether Texas voters who lack immunity to COVID-19 qualify to vote by mail under Election Code § 82.002(a) (mail-in voting for voters with a "sickness or physical condition" that prevents in-person voting without a likelihood of injuring health).
Historically Texas has allowed absentee voting for disability since 1935 and removed physician-certificates and other proof requirements in the 1980s and 1990s; the statute requires only that the applicant indicate the ground of eligibility.
The State argued that a lack of COVID-19 immunity is not a "physical condition" under the statute; the Harris County Clerk argued broadly that all Harris County voters should be allowed to vote by mail.
Justice Bland (concurring) concludes a lack of immunity is a "physical condition," but that lack of immunity alone does not automatically make every unimmune voter disabled for purposes of absentee voting.
Whether a voter is disabled depends on the individual voter’s physical state, health history, and local voting environment because the statute requires a showing that the condition creates a "likelihood" of injuring the voter’s health from in-person voting.
Election officials have a ministerial duty to accept properly completed mail‑in applications and may not inquire into or second‑guess a voter’s health determination; concerns about mail‑ballot fraud do not justify denying eligible voters.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does "physical condition" include lack of immunity to COVID‑19?	State: "Physical condition" excludes lack of immunity; immunity is not a physical condition.	Harris County Clerk: lack of immunity should permit widespread mail voting.	Held: "Physical condition" includes lack of immunity.
Does lack of immunity alone make a voter "disabled" and automatically eligible for mail voting?	State: No; lack of immunity is not a qualifying physical condition.	Clerk: All voters (in Harris County) should be allowed by mail.	Held: Lack of immunity alone is insufficient; disability requires that the condition create a "likelihood" of injury from in‑person voting.
Who determines whether the voter faces a "likelihood" of injury—voter or election official?	State: Implied that officials may evaluate eligibility.	Clerk: Officials should permit broad access; county officials favor liberal access.	Held: The voter decides whether their condition creates the required likelihood; clerks have only a ministerial duty to process properly completed applications and may not police voters' health claims.
Do fraud concerns allow election officials to deny mail ballots to claimants?	State: Mail‑ballot fraud risks justify restrictions.	Clerk: Fraud risk does not negate voter eligibility.	Held: Fraud risk is real but does not permit disenfranchising voters who submit valid applications; fraudulent applications should be prosecuted.

Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. 2014) (when a statute omits a definition, courts apply the word’s common, ordinary meaning)
BankDirect Capital Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC, 519 S.W.3d 76 (Tex. 2017) (courts must rely on statutory text rather than rewrite it)
City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2008) (plain statutory language governs; avoid inserting words the legislature omitted)
Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. 2017) (presume legislature chooses statutory language with care)
TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. 2016) (statutes should be construed to give effect to each provision and avoid surplusage)
State v. K.E.W., 315 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. 2010) (interpreting "likelihood" as synonymous with "reasonable probability")
Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2020) (courts may not add words omitted by the Legislature)
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (affirming the central importance of the right to vote)
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (the right to vote is essential and preservative of other rights)