in Re State Board for Educator Certification
2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8117
Tex. App.2013Background
- State Board for Educator Certification petitioned for writ of mandamus and temporary relief to challenge a trial court order refusing to allow the Board to supersede the trial court’s judgment.
- In the underlying proceeding, Erasmo Montalvo sought judicial review of the Board’s revocation of his educator certificate.
- The trial court ruled in favor of Montalvo, reversed the Board’s decision, permanently enjoined the Board from treating as revoked or revoking the certificate, and held that any appeal would not supersede the judgment pending appeal.
- The Board sought mandamus relief and temporary relief from the order, arguing the court should or must allow supersedeas for governmental entities.
- The appellate court concluded the trial court had discretion under Rule 24.2(a)(3) to deny supersedeas and denied the Board’s mandamus petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court had discretion to deny supersedeas for an other-judgment against a governmental entity | Board argues Rule 24.2(a)(3) and case law permit denial of supersedeas or automatic suspension by appeal | Montalvo argues the State lacks discretion to deny supersedeas when the judgment is not monetary | Discretion exists; court can deny supersedeas under Rule 24.2(a)(3) |
| Whether TRAP 25.1(h) and related caselaw compel automatic suspension for governmental appeals over non-monetary judgments | Board asserts automatic suspension by notice of appeal per Rule 25.1(h) | Montalvo contends Rule 25.1(h) does not override discretion under Rule 24.2(a)(3) in these circumstances | Rule 25.1(h) acknowledges automatic suspension but does not negate trial court discretion to deny or undo suspension under Rule 24.2(a)(3) |
Key Cases Cited
- Hill v. Fourteenth Ct. of Apps., 695 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1985) (amendment to Rule 364(f) gave trial court discretion on non-monetary judgments)
- Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Fourteenth Ct. of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1986) (trial court discretionary to deny supersedeas for injunctive judgments)
- In re Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 967 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. 1998) (exempt entity; court discretion to deny supersedeas exists; not to deny right to appeal; burden on appellee to seek denial or offer bond)
- In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1999) (reiterates trial court discretion to deny suspension of final judgments for exempt entities; burden on appellee to request denial or offer bond)
- City of Robstown v. Westergren, 774 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989) (discretionary authority under former Rule 47(f) to deny suspension; automatic suspension depends on discretion)
- State v. Schless, 815 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991) (discretionary authority to deny suspension in appropriate circumstances)
- Cascos v. Cameron County Attorney, 319 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2010) (court criticized/limited Cascos’ reasoning re: government entity and supersedeas; discussed Long and Westergren lineage)
- In re Tarrant County, 16 S.W.3d 914 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000) (governmental entity right to supersede by notice of appeal; question of trial court discretion noted)