in Re State Board for Educator Certification
452 S.W.3d 802
| Tex. | 2014Background
- Board revoked Montalvo's teaching certificate; trial court reversed and enjoined Board from superseding during appeal.
- Board appealed and sought mandamus to supersede; merits of the underlying appeal remain pending.
- Governmental entity CPRC 6.001 exempts bond filing; State's notice of appeal generally creates automatic supersedeas for non-money judgments.
- TRAP 24.2(a)(3) allows trial court to decline to permit supersedeas when security is posted; question is whether this discretion exists against a government appellant.
- Prior cases (DART, Long) recognized trial courts may deny automatic suspense in appropriate circumstances; Ammex recognized automatic supersedeas for the State but did not foreclose court discretion.
- Court's holding: trial court may deny supersedeas of a non-money judgment against the State if security is posted; State's notice of appeal is not an unlimited right to automatic suspension.
- Merits not addressed; decision is strictly procedural regarding suspension rights during appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does TRAP 24.2(a)(3) override automatic suspension for government appeals? | Montalvo argues automatic suspension applies; security not required. | Board argues right to automatic supersedeas is absolute under TRAP 25.1(h). | No; TRAP 24.2(a)(3) preserves trial-court discretion to deny supersedeas when security is posted. |
| Do CPRC 6.001 and TRAP 25.1(h) bind the trial court to grant automatic supersedeas to the State? | State argues automatic supersedeas is automatic with notice of appeal. | Montalvo contends TRAP 24.2(a)(3) tempers automatic suspension. | Not absolute; discretionary denial allowed under TRAP 24.2(a)(3). |
| Is there unlimited governmental power to suspend judgments pending appeal? | State seeks broad authority to suspend. | Court should limit executive power to ensure judicial balance. | No; judiciary retains discretion to condition or deny suspension. |
| What is required for the trial court to exercise its discretion properly? | Discretion exists but must be demonstrably exercised with balancing equities. | Discretion may be exercised without detailed factual findings. | Record must reflect balancing of equities; remand may be needed if not shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ammex Warehouse Co. v. Archer, 381 S.W.2d 478 (Tex.1964) (State's supersedeas right upon notice of appeal; not unlimited discretion for trial courts)
- In re Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 967 S.W.2d 358 (Tex.1998) (trial court discretion to deny automatic stay preserved in DART context)
- In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 626 (Tex.1999) (similarly recognized discretionary denial of supersedeas under TRAP 24.2(a)(3))
- Klein Independent School District v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 87 (Tex.1986) (TRAP 24.2(a)(3) purpose to condition stay on security for non-money relief)
- Storey v. Central Hide & Rendering Co., 226 S.W.2d 615 (Tex.1950) (balancing equities as injunction standard)