In re Sealed Case
405 U.S. App. D.C. 36
| D.C. Cir. | 2013Background
- FBI executed search warrants on March 2, 2012 in Washington, D.C. as part of a grand jury investigation; over sixty boxes and electronic devices containing millions of pages of documents were seized.
- District court denied Rule 41(g) motions seeking return of seized material beyond the warrants’ scope and/or privileged material.
- Government copied and returned many electronic-device contents; copies of documents were made available or returned.
- Parties proposed protocols to identify privileged material; no agreement reached, leading to Rule 41(g) motion practice.
- By January 14, 2013, the parties reached agreement on identifying privileged material; appellate review narrowed to the district court’s handling of non-privileged documents beyond the scope of the warrants; the court ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
- The opinion holds that Rule 41(g) motions are not independent of ongoing criminal prosecutions and that Perlman doctrine does not extend to these motions, so the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 41(g) motions are independent of ongoing criminal prosecutions. | [Redacted] argues motions are solely for return of property. | [Redacted] argues motions are integrated with investigation and strategy. | No; DiBella test shows not independent. |
| Whether Perlman doctrine provides jurisdiction to review denial of Rule 41(g) motions. | [Redacted] relies on Perlman to obtain appellate review. | DiBella limits jurisdiction; Perlman not applicable here. | Perlman doctrine does not apply to Rule 41(g) motions. |
| Whether the district court’s denial is final or reviewable under a collateral-order, mootness, or other exception. | Mootness argued due to privilege dispute; ongoing appeal. | Perlman inapplicable; no final order and no collateral interlocutory appeal. | No appellate jurisdiction; order dismissed. |
| Whether any exception to finality allows appellate review of the denial of Rule 41(g) motions. | Asserts Perlman allows review of disclosure-related orders. | Mohawk/Will-type caution against expanding a collateral doctrine. | DiBella governs; no jurisdiction under Perlman. |
Key Cases Cited
- DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962) (test for independence of Rule 41(g) motions from ongoing prosecutions)
- Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940) (finality principle for avoiding piecemeal appeals in criminal cases)
- Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (finality limits in juvenile/due process contexts; relevance to reviewability)
- In re Warrant Dated Dec. 14, 1990, 961 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1992) (discusses Rule 41(g) scope and finality considerations)
- Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918) (disclosure/privilege-related appealability under Perlman doctrine)
- Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992) (Perlman doctrine and disclosure rights)
- In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per Perlman rationale for jurisdiction in unique orders)
- In re Berkley & Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980) (peripheral appealability related to privilege orders)
- Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (narrow, selective scope of collateral orders)