In re Sanders, 495 Mich. 394

Background

Petition filed by Michigan DHS after youngest child born drug-positive; mother (Sanders) pleaded no contest and was adjudicated unfit; father (Laird) initially had custody but later removed after drug-positive tests and other concerns.
DHS dismissed allegations against Laird and his adjudication was cancelled, but the trial court withheld placement with Laird, limited his contact, and ordered him to comply with a case service plan relying on the "one-parent doctrine."
The one-parent doctrine permits dispositional orders affecting both parents once jurisdiction over the child is established by adjudication of one parent, without a separate fitness determination for the other parent.
Laird challenged the doctrine as violating his Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights because it allowed infringement of his parental rights without an adjudication of his unfitness; Court of Appeals had upheld the doctrine in In re CR.
The Michigan Supreme Court held the one-parent doctrine unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and overruled In re CR; it vacated the trial court’s dispositional order and remanded for proceedings consistent with requiring a specific adjudication of a parent’s unfitness before infringing parental rights.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Laird)	Defendant's Argument (DHS)	Held
Whether the one-parent doctrine violates due process by permitting dispositional orders against an unadjudicated parent	One-parent doctrine allows deprivation of fundamental parental rights without a fitness hearing; violates Stanley and Eldridge balancing	Dispositional process and existing proceedings provide sufficient process; adjudication of one parent supplies necessary authority	Held unconstitutional: due process requires a specific adjudication of each parent’s unfitness before the state may infringe that parent’s fundamental rights
Whether a dispositional hearing suffices as constitutionally adequate process for an unadjudicated parent	Dispositional phase lacks the fact‑finding and protections of adjudication; high risk of erroneous deprivation	Dispositional phase affords notice, participation, review, and case-plan protections sufficient for due process	Held that dispositional hearings are constitutionally inadequate substitutes for adjudications when parental rights are infringed
Whether assumption of jurisdiction based on one parent justifies orders affecting the other parent without proving that other parent unfit	Jurisdiction over the child does not eliminate the requirement to adjudicate each parent before infringing that parent’s rights	Court rules and statutes permit orders affecting "any adult" once jurisdiction over the child exists; presumption of constitutionality	Held: jurisdiction over the child does not relieve the state of the obligation to adjudicate each parent’s fitness before depriving that parent of custody/control
Mootness of Laird's claim due to subsequent incarceration	Incarceration does not eliminate parental rights (still can control child-care decisions)	DHS argued case moot given incarceration	Held not moot — incarceration does not negate the due-process claim

Key Cases Cited

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (U.S. 1972) (parent entitled to a hearing on fitness before children are taken)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (heightened procedural protections required when terminating parental rights)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (three-factor balancing test to determine what process is due)
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (U.S. 2000) (presumption that fit parents act in child's best interests; parental decisionmaking is fundamental)
In re Brock, 442 Mich. 101 (Mich. 1993) (distinction between adjudicative and dispositional phases in child-protective proceedings)
In re CR, 250 Mich. App. 185 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (Court of Appeals decision endorsing the one-parent doctrine; overruled by Michigan Supreme Court)
In re Mason, 486 Mich. 142 (Mich. 2010) (interpretation of juvenile procedures and parental protections)