In re S.T., 151 A.3d 522

Infant sustained multiple fractures in Oct 2013; DCYF removed the child and adjudicated the father for abuse and the mother for neglect based on a reported “tug-of-war” incident.
Both parents were criminally charged; father pled guilty and was imprisoned; mother was tried, convicted of second-degree assault (Jan 2015), and sentenced to a lengthy term, then incarcerated.
Child was placed with maternal grandparents and later transitioned toward a foster family prepared to adopt. DCYF filed for termination of the mother’s parental rights under RSA 170-C:5, VI and VII(d) (felony conviction and incarceration; felony assault resulting in injury).
The TPR trial court found statutory grounds proven beyond a reasonable doubt and terminated the mother’s rights in Feb 2016 while the mother’s direct criminal appeal of her conviction remained pending.
This Court reversed the mother’s criminal conviction on direct appeal (Mar 2016), concluding trial error; the mother then appealed the TPR order arguing termination was improper while her criminal appeal was unresolved and that termination was not in the child’s best interest.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the TPR order, holding that when a TPR ground depends on a criminal conviction and the parent has timely appealed raising innocence/guilt issues, termination cannot proceed until resolution of the direct appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a TPR may be based on a criminal "conviction" while the conviction is on direct appeal raising guilt/innocence	Conviction at trial suffices; waiting for appeal unduly delays permanency and harms child	Termination while appeal pending risks irrevocable error if conviction is reversed; conviction not final until direct appeal resolved	Termination may not proceed on a conviction-based ground while a timely direct appeal raising innocence/guilt is pending; "convicted/conviction" requires affirmance on direct appeal
Whether termination was in the child’s best interest (mother argued)	DCYF: permanency and lengthy incarceration justify termination	Mother: appellate reversal could change fitness; fundamental liberty interest supports delay	Court did not reach merits after resolving the procedural error (reversed on statutory interpretation)

In re C.M., 166 N.H. 764 (N.H. 2014) (burden and procedure for TPR; statutory construction principles)
In re Zachary G., 159 N.H. 146 (N.H. 2009) (standard for reviewing TPR rulings)
State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713 (N.H. 1978) (parental rights as fundamental liberty interest)
People in Interest of T.T., 845 P.2d 539 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (conviction at trial suffices for TPR; policy favoring child permanency)
In Interest of Kody D.V., 548 N.W.2d 837 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (conviction not final until direct appeal exhausted; protect parent’s fundamental rights)
In re Reynaldo F., 681 N.W.2d 289 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (clarifying appeal limitation: direct appeals on guilt affect finality)