Background - SS is the child of Michael Brunswick (father) and Stephanie (mother). SS lived with Stephanie and her husband Wesley Sweigart in Van Wert County since May 1, 2015. - Michael paid court-ordered child support but had no court-ordered visitation; visits were governed by verbal agreement (typically every other weekend) until late 2015/early 2016. - Stephanie told Michael he could not have SS again unless he obtained an attorney; parties disagree on timing (Stephanie: final visit Oct. 4, 2015 and condition ~Oct. 16, 2015; Michael: final visit Jan. 10, 2016 and condition Jan. 22, 2016). - Michael made limited contacts (birthday phone call, Sweetest Day flower) and filed for shared parenting/visitation in Mercer County on Sept. 30, 2016; Sweigart filed to adopt SS on Oct. 31, 2016 claiming Michael had not had more than de minimis contact for the prior year. - Probate court found Michael lacked more-than-de-minimis contact for the year before the adoption petition and that Stephanie’s requirement to get an attorney was not significant interference; it approved proceeding without Michael’s consent. - The appellate court reversed, finding error in (1) failing to account for Stephanie’s unilateral condition (and the time reasonably necessary to comply) and (2) allowing a probate adoption to proceed while a juvenile-court parenting action concerning the child was pending. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Michael) | Defendant's Argument (Sweigart/Stephanie) | Held | |---|---:|---|---| | Whether Michael had failed for one year to provide more-than-de-minimis contact under R.C. 3107.07(A) | Michael contends he made contact and filed for shared parenting within a year; time during which mother conditioned visits should not be counted against him | Sweigart/Stephanie contend Michael’s last meaningful contact was Oct. 4, 2015 and subsequent contacts were de minimis | Reversed: trial court erred; mother’s imposition of a condition and Michael’s compliance efforts alter the timing and meaning of contact | | Whether mother’s requirement that father obtain an attorney constituted significant interference (justifiable cause) | Michael argues the requirement was significant interference that prevented contact and justified his delay in filing | Mother argues the request was not a significant obstacle and that limited contacts (flower/call) were de minimis | Held for Michael: trial court failed to properly consider that the unilateral condition was significant and required reasonable time to comply | | Whether Michael’s filing for shared parenting within one year counted as an attempted contact / barred the adoption | Michael argues his Sept. 30, 2016 Mercer County filing was the required step to regain contact and addressed long-term parenting, so probate should not proceed | Probate allowed the adoption despite the juvenile-court filing | Held for Michael: juvenile-court parenting action was pending and probate should have refrained from proceeding with adoption without his consent | | Whether probate court properly exercised discretion in resolving credibility/timing issues | Sweigart/Stephanie relied on trial-court credibility findings that favored Stephanie | Michael argued trial court’s factual findings were inconsistent and misapplied the law about interference and reasonable time to comply | Held: trial court made legal error (not mere credibility choice) in failing to account for interference and concurrent juvenile action; judgment reversed | ### Key Cases Cited In re Adoption of M.B., 963 N.E.2d 142 (Ohio 2012) (framework for two-step R.C. 3107.07(A) analysis: failure to communicate then justifiable cause) In re Adoption of Holcomb, 481 N.E.2d 613 (Ohio 1985) (significant interference by custodial parent can establish justifiable cause) In re Adoption of Masa, 492 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio 1986) (parental rights are fundamental; standards for construing adoption-consent statutes) In re Adoption of P.A.C., 933 N.E.2d 236 (Ohio 2010) (severance of parental rights requires strict construction of statutory exceptions) In re Adoption of Pushcar, 853 N.E.2d 647 (Ohio 2006) (probate court should refrain from proceeding when juvenile court is deciding the child’s long-term fate) Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (parents’ right to custody is a fundamental liberty interest)