In re: S.K., 215 A.3d 300

In 2016–17 a 16‑year‑old female (S.K.) sent a one‑minute cellphone video via group text to two friends showing herself performing fellatio; the video later circulated at school.
School resource officer obtained a copy after students brought it to him; S.K. admitted she sent it only to her two friends. The State charged juvenile S.K. with (1) filming a minor (dismissed), (2) distributing child pornography (CR § 11‑207(a)(4)), and (3) displaying an obscene item to a minor (CR § 11‑203(b)(1)(ii)).
The juvenile court found S.K. delinquent on counts 2 and 3; she received probation and electronic monitoring; case later sealed after completion of probation.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed on the child‑pornography count but reversed on the obscenity/items count, holding a digital video file was not an “item” in CR § 11‑203(a)(4).
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari, considered whether a minor can be both the depicted subject and the distributor under CR § 11‑207(a)(4), and whether a texted digital video falls within the statutory definition of an “item” and is obscene.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (S.K.)	Held
Whether a minor who is the subject of a sexual video can be adjudicated for distributing child pornography under CR § 11‑207(a)(4)	Statute’s plain language covers any “person” who distributes matter depicting a minor engaged as a subject in sexual conduct; “person” includes minors; no textual exemption for self‑produced imagery	Statute targets exploiters, not minors who consensually create/distribute images of themselves; “engaged as a subject” implies lack of consent/control and the statute’s structure treats “person” and “minor” as distinct	Affirmed: statute unambiguous; a minor may be adjudicated for distributing self‑produced child pornography under CR § 11‑207(a)(4)
Whether a cellphone texted digital video is an “item” under CR § 11‑203(a)(4) and, if so, whether the video is obscene when displayed to minors	“Film” and the statutory list were intended to cover technological advances; a digital video file is a modern form of film and the video depicts illicit sex so it is obscene	The listed “items” refer to tangible media; “film” should mean a physical medium (not content), so a digital file falls outside the statutory list; also contested whether the State proved obscenity	Reversed Court of Special Appeals: a digital video file falls within “film” as used in the statute, the video depicts illicit sex and is obscene, and S.K. violated CR § 11‑203(b)(1)(ii)

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1972) (states may proscribe distribution of sexual material involving minors without applying ordinary obscenity standards; distribution intrinsically tied to exploitation)
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (established multi‑part test for obscenity referenced by Maryland statute)
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (distinguishes First Amendment protection for obscene adult material from criminalization of child pornography)
Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20 (1994) (Maryland case recognizing substantial state interest in prohibiting use of children as subjects in pornographic material)
Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446 (2005) (discussing Ferber and state interest in preventing sexual exploitation of children)
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (contextual discussion on pervasiveness and centrality of modern cellphones)
Sieglin v. Schmidt, 447 Md. 647 (2016) (statutory term construed to encompass post‑enactment technological developments when consistent with legislative intent)
State v. Gray, 189 Wash.2d 334 (2017) (Washington Supreme Court held statute applied to minor who distributed images of himself; plain‑meaning approach without judicially creating exemptions)