In re: S.K., 215 A.3d 300

In 2016–17 a 16‑year‑old (S.K.) sent a one‑minute cellphone video via group text to two friends showing herself performing fellatio; the video later circulated at school.
School officials obtained the video; S.K. admitted she sent it only to two friends; she was interviewed and later charged as a juvenile.
The State charged S.K. under Maryland Criminal Law § 11‑207(a)(4) (distribution of child pornography) and § 11‑203(b)(1)(ii) (displaying obscene item to a minor); one filming charge was dismissed at trial.
Juvenile court found S.K. delinquent on distribution and obscenity counts; she was placed on probation and electronic monitoring; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed distribution but reversed as to the obscenity “item” definition.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide (1) whether a minor can be adjudicated for distributing child pornography when the minor is the person depicted, and (2) whether a texted digital video qualifies as an “item” under the obscenity statute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a minor who transmits a sexted video of herself can be adjudicated for distributing child pornography under CR § 11‑207(a)(4)	S.K.: statute targets exploiters; phrase “engaged as a subject” implies lack of consent or control; legislature intended to protect, not prosecute, minors	State: plain text covers any "person" who distributes depictions of a minor; no statutory exception for minors; legislative history shows intent to eradicate child pornography broadly	Court: Affirmed — plain statutory language covers minors transmitting self‑produced sexually explicit material; no judicially created exception for minors
Whether a digital cellphone video sent by text is an “item” under CR § 11‑203(a)(4) (obscene item displayed to a minor)	S.K.: the enumerated list targets physical media; “film” means a medium and does not encompass a standalone digital file; legislature has not expressly added digital files	State: list was intended to foreclose technological loopholes; “film” may be read to include motion pictures/digital video; statutes should cover post‑enactment technologies	Court: Reversed Court of Special Appeals — a digital video file qualifies as a “film”/motion picture under the item definition; the video is obscene and display to minors violated § 11‑203(b)(1)

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (states may proscribe distribution of sexual materials involving minors without relying on obscenity standards; protecting children from sexual exploitation is compelling)
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (recognizing pervasive role of modern cellphones and privacy implications)
Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20 (1994) (Maryland history and purpose of child pornography statutes aimed at preventing exploitation of children)
Sieglein v. Schmidt, 447 Md. 647 (2016) (statutory terms may be interpreted to encompass post‑enactment technological developments when consistent with legislative intent)
State v. Gray, 189 Wash.2d 334 (2017) (Washington Supreme Court held a juvenile could be convicted under a child‑porn statute for disseminating images of himself; emphasized plain statutory text and legislative prerogative to change law)