In re Robert T. Keeler Maintenance Fund for the Hanover Country Club at Dartmouth College
2022-0145
N.H.Jul 13, 2023Background
- Decedent's 1999 will gave 50% of his residuary estate to Dartmouth "for the sole purpose of upgrading and maintaining its golf course," with any excess (in executor's discretion) payable to the Robert T. Keeler Foundation; the instrument contained no express reverter to the estate.
- In 2005 the executor and Dartmouth executed a Statement of Understanding treating the $1.8M bequest as a quasi-endowment restricted to upgrades and maintenance of the Hanover Country Club golf course.
- Dartmouth permanently closed the Hanover Country Club golf course in July 2020, then (with the Director of Charitable Trusts' assent) sought modification under UPMIFA (RSA 292-B:6, III) to redirect the fund to golf practice facilities, varsity golf support, and related purposes.
- The Estate was reopened and Mithoefer appointed fiduciary; the Foundation and Estate moved to intervene asserting they had a right to any funds in "excess" and that closure frustrated the donor's purpose.
- The probate court denied intervention for lack of standing (but invited an amici brief, which was not filed) and granted Dartmouth's assented-to UPMIFA modification; the putative intervenors appealed.
- The Supreme Court affirmed: it declined to extend the special-interest (Blasko) standing framework from In re Trust of Eddy to UPMIFA modification proceedings and concluded that modern statutes (Uniform Trust Code/UPMIFA) reduce the need for common-law cy pres/resulting-trust analysis invoked by the intervenors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Foundation and Estate had standing to intervene in the UPMIFA modification (special-interest standing under Blasko/In re Trust of Eddy) | The putative intervenors claimed "special interest" standing under the Blasko five-factor test and urged the court to allow intervention to protect a vested or contingent interest | Dartmouth and DCT argued RSA 292-B:6, III governs and that special-interest standing as applied in In re Trust of Eddy should not be extended to UPMIFA modification proceedings; only the institution and attorney general are statutorily identified | Court held intervenors lacked standing; declined to extend Blasko/In re Trust of Eddy special-interest test to UPMIFA modification proceedings and affirmed denial of intervention |
| Whether denial of intervention violated constitutional or property rights (vested interest/resulting trust/contract claim) | Intervenors argued closure frustrated donor intent such that remaining funds would result to estate/Foundation, creating a vested interest and implicating contract/constitutional clauses | Dartmouth/DCT argued UPMIFA/Uniform Trust Code presumptively permit cy pres-style modification without reversion to donor or estate; estate could still pursue any separate contract claim | Court rejected the constitutional/vested-interest arguments, explaining modern statutory scheme eliminates the old common-law presumption of reversion in most cases and noting the Estate could still pursue a breach of contract claim separately |
| Whether the probate court erred in granting Dartmouth’s assented-to UPMIFA modification | Intervenors argued modification was improper (raised on appeal but not resolved due to lack of standing) | Dartmouth asserted modification was authorized under RSA 292-B:6, III because the original purpose became impracticable | Court did not reach merits because lack of intervenor standing was dispositive; it affirmed the modification order as challenged parties lacked standing to appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Trust of Eddy, 172 N.H. 266 (2019) (adopted Blasko five-factor test for special-interest standing in charitable-trust enforcement suits)
- Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. 531 (1957) (articulated traditional common-law cy pres/resulting-trust principles prior to adoption of uniform statutes)
- Hodges v. Johnson, 170 N.H. 470 (2017) (when interpreting an enacted uniform law, the drafters' intent is treated as legislative intent)
- In re Estate of Donovan, 162 N.H. 1 (2011) (standard of appellate review for probate division factual findings)
- In the Matter of Goodlander & Tamposi, 161 N.H. 490 (2011) (intervention requires a direct, apparent right or interest)