In Re Rmt, 352 S.W.3d 12

The Texas Court of Appeals Texarkana reviewed the termination of parental rights of John and Melissa with their child R.M.T.; Melissa did not appeal and John appealed only on his mental competence at trial.
A competency evaluation in a related criminal case found John incompetent to stand trial, and that incompetence persisted at the February 28, 2011 termination trial.
Three days before trial, John filed a verified motion for continuance alleging incompetence; the trial court denied the continuance and trial proceeded.
John was allowed to testify at trial over counsel’s objection that he was not competent to testify.
The trial relied on the Texas Family Code, including a strict deadline to try or dismiss the case (with limited extensions) and appointment provisions for a guardian ad litem if needed.
The court weighed Eldridge factors and ultimately held that John received due process and that continuance was not required; the grounds for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the trial court err in denying a continuance given John’s alleged incompetence?	John argues denial deprived him of due process.	Court claimed no abuse of discretion and adequate due process under the statute.	No abuse of discretion; continuance denial affirmed.
Was proceeding to trial while John was incompetent a due process violation?	John contends due process requires delay until competence, given Eldridge factors.	State argues timely resolution protects the child’s best interests; no due process violation.	Proceeding with trial complied with due process under Eldridge balancing.
Was the admission of John’s testimony over counsel's objection error under Rule 601?	John claims admission of testimony despite incompetence was erroneous.	State asserts no reversible error; testimony did not yield an improper judgment.	No reversible error; judgment affirmed.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (due process balancing framework for procedural safeguards)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (parental rights termination requires substantial due process protections)
In re E.L.T., 93 S.W.3d 372 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002) (no competency hearing required; termination proceeding not necessarily halted by incompetence)
In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. 2003) ( Eldridge factors apply to termination cases; emphasis on timely finality for child)
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) (parental rights termination; child’s best interest and timely resolution)
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (U.S. 2000) (substantive due process in parental rights context)
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1981) (strong protection of parental rights in child custody matters)
Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985) (termination proceedings implicate fundamental rights; strict scrutiny applied)