in Re Richard W. Jackson and Lisa C. Jackson
03-17-00849-CV
| Tex. App. | Dec 15, 2017Background
- Richard and Lisa Jackson (plaintiffs/relators) obtained a temporary injunction (March 2017) enjoining Janice Cox and Helen Ramsey (defendants) from recording amendments to 1972 deed restrictions that would limit short‑term rentals.
- Defendants later pursued an amendment process under Section 1.4 (majority-signature method) to ban rentals under 90 days; they did not obtain an ACC recommendation or provide written 30‑day notice to all owners. Plaintiffs claim the amendment process must follow Article IX (30‑day notice + ACC recommendation).
- After the trial court granted defendants partial summary judgment on the contract‑interpretation issue (court later ruled in defendants’ favor on Section 4/Article I issue), defendants moved (Dec. 4, 2017) to dissolve the temporary injunction; the court dissolved it on Dec. 8 without an evidentiary hearing; defendants recorded an amendment Dec. 11, 2017.
- Relators sought emergency mandamus/interlocutory appellate review and moved this Court to stay the trial and/or the trial court’s order dissolving the temporary injunction, arguing the dissolution occurred without evidentiary support and that recording the amendment harms relators’ property rights.
- At the March 9, 2017 temporary‑injunction hearing (trial court reporter record), the trial court ruled for plaintiffs and granted a temporary injunction enjoining defendants from recording amendments absent compliance with notice and ACC processes; a $10,000 bond remained in effect and the court set a bench trial for the week of June 26–30, 2017.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the temporary injunction may be dissolved without an evidentiary showing of changed circumstances | Jacksons: dissolution was improper; defendants offered no evidence; appellate stay warranted to preserve status quo and prevent recordation of suspect instruments | Cox/Ramsey: court’s partial summary judgment interpreting the deed restrictions eliminates the injunction’s basis, so dissolution is appropriate | Trial court had originally granted the temporary injunction. Relators sought appellate relief; in the temporary‑injunction hearing the trial court concluded the plaintiffs were entitled to maintain the injunction and signed an order maintaining the status quo (injunction stayed in place; bond to remain). |
| Proper procedure to amend 1972 deed restrictions: does Section 1.4 (majority signature) require 30‑day written notice and ACC recommendation from Article IX? | Jacksons: Article IX’s 30‑day notice and ACC recommendation apply and defendants failed to comply; amendment attempts are invalid without those steps | Cox/Ramsey: Section 1.4 provides a separate mechanism (majority signatures at anniversary intervals) that does not require Article IX procedures; Article IX is a separate, standalone method | The court found the parties disputed interpretation; in the March 9 hearing the court sided with plaintiffs and enjoined defendants from recording amendments absent the Article IX process (30‑day notice and ACC involvement) while preserving the status quo. (Note: defendants had sought and in later filings obtained partial summary judgment on Section 4; that factual posture underlies the appellate mandamus.) |
| Enforceability of deed‑restriction enforcement clause (waiving need to show irreparable harm or inadequacy of legal remedy) | Jacksons: enforcement clause authorizes injunctions without showing irreparable injury; such contractual remedy is enforceable | Cox/Ramsey: contract cannot change judicial standards; plaintiffs still must show inadequacy of legal remedy; clause should not eliminate ordinary requirements | Trial court accepted plaintiffs’ contractual enforcement argument in granting the temporary injunction (holding that injunction relief could be granted under the deed restrictions’ enforcement clause). |
| Whether trial should be stayed while mandamus/interlocutory appeal pend | Jacksons: trial should be stayed because the dissolution order (if effective) would affect wrongful injunction counterclaim and trial posture; need to preserve appellate review | Cox/Ramsey: no stay; they can pursue amendment and record it; legal remedies available | Trial was set for June 26–30, 2017; the transcript reflects the court’s intent to preserve the status quo via the injunction and proceed to trial; relators sought appellate relief to stay the dissolution order and/or trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Murphy v. McDaniel, 20 S.W.3d 873 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000) (discusses circumstances warranting dissolution of a temporary injunction)
- Energy Transfer Fuel, L.P. v. Bryan, 322 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2010) (discusses recovery of injunction bond and related remedies)
- DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990) (parties may contractually allocate remedies; courts enforce contractual remedies not contrary to public policy)
- Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983) (contract‑interpretation principles govern construction of deed restrictions)