In Re RH
14 A.3d 267
Vt.2010Background
- DCF placed petitioner R.H. in the child protection registry after substantiating that she substantially risked harm to her then 3-year-old daughter J.H. by leaving her unattended in an unlocked, unheated van in the early morning of March 8, 2008.
- The independent reviewer accepted DCF’s substantiation based on a single-egregious-act framework and a DCF policy requiring four criteria for substantiation.
- The Human Services Board reversed the substantiation, finding the risk did not warrant registry inclusion.
- Petitioner sought a fair hearing; the Board’s reversal prompted this appeal addressing the proper legal standard and scope of review.
- The Vermont Supreme Court ultimately reversed and remanded to apply the correct statutory standard (per Policy No. 55) and to resolve collateral-estoppel arguments under the appropriate framework.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What standard governs registry substantiation for a single incident | R.H. argues Board should apply Policy No. 55 single-egregious-act standard | DCF argues substantiation should be guided by statutory risk standards (gross negligence) | Board exceeded its authority; proper standard is the single-egregious-act framework (Policy No. 55) as adopted by DCF, to be applied on remand. |
| May the Board consider future risk or post-incident conduct in substantiation | Substantiation is based on the March 8 incident, not future conduct | Board can consider future risk to determine ongoing safety | Board may not base substantiation on future risk; must rely on the incident’s substantial-risk-at-the-time standard; remand for correct application. |
| Is petitioner collaterally estopped by the family court’s relief-from-abuse finding | Family court finding precludes re-litigation of abuse grounds | Collateral estoppel applies to preclude relitigation of identical issues | Not precluded; family court’s standard differed; expungement/registry determinations require different legal standards; not identical issue. |
| What is the proper scope of the Board’s de novo review versus DCF’s factual findings | Board should defer to DCF's findings and compel substantiation | Board may conduct de novo review to determine if statutory standards are satisfied | Board must conduct de novo review but must apply correct statutory standard; adopt DCF’s interpretation on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rivard v. Roy, 124 Vt. 32 (1963) (defines gross negligence standard for risk of harm)
- Bushey-Combs, 160 Vt. 326 (1993) (Board may conduct de novo review; substantiation not purely appellate)
- K.G. v. Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 171 Vt. 529 (2000) (defers to Board on credibility, reviews substantiation for abuse of discretion)
- In re E.C., 2010 VT 50 (2010) (raises standard of review for Board in registry cases; defers to Board on legal standard)
- In re P.J., 2009 VT 5 (2009) (addresses collateral estoppel in CHINS context (distinguishable))
- Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc., 155 Vt. 259 (1990) (sets five-part test for offensive collateral estoppel)
- Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (abuse of discretion when based on erroneous view of law)