IN RE REVISION OF PORTION OF RULES OF COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
2017 OK CR 4
| Okla. Crim. App. | 2017Background
- The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals revised Rule 1.2(D) (Methods of Appeal or Review) by order dated February 24, 2017, to clarify appellate procedures.
- The revision was intended to acknowledge the right of appeal recognized in Tate v. State and to conform Rule 1.2(D) to the holding in Gonseth v. State.
- The amendment republished portions of the Court’s Rules (22 O.S., Ch. 18, App.) governing various appeal types, with specific cross-references to rule sections and Oklahoma statutes.
- Key clarifications concern appeals from Orders Deferring Imposition of Judgment and Sentence (deferred judgments), acceleration proceedings (when deferred sentences are converted to judgment and sentence), and the scope/timing of appeals challenging probation terms versus plea validity.
- The rule states that: (a) a defendant may appeal probation terms imposed with a deferred judgment separately from challenging plea validity; (b) failure to appeal probation terms does not preclude later certiorari review of plea validity if the deferral is later accelerated; and (c) failing to challenge plea validity at the time of a deferred-judgment appeal can constitute waiver.
- The order also aligns procedures for termination from Drug Court and Mental Health Court with the acceleration-appeal rules and confirms effective date as the order date.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 1.2(D) must expressly acknowledge Tate right of appeal | Tate recognizes a right to appeal certain Mental Health Court terminations; rule should reflect that | Existing rule text does not clearly mention Tate; risk of mismatch with precedent | Court revised Rule 1.2(D) to acknowledge Tate and conform rule to precedent |
| Whether defendant may appeal probation terms of an Order Deferring Imposition separately from plea validity | Defendant may appeal probation terms separate from plea validity; may also seek withdrawal of plea or certiorari later | Court/State may contend scope and timing should be limited to avoid piecemeal review | Rule provides defendants can appeal probation terms separately; outlines options for challenging plea validity (regular appeal, Rule 4.1 withdrawal, or certiorari) and warns of waiver if not timely asserted |
| Proper procedure and scope for appeals of acceleration proceedings (when a deferral is converted to judgment) | Appeals of acceleration errors should follow regular felony/misdemeanor appeal procedures and be limited to validity of acceleration order | State argues appeals should be tied to timing of imposition and limited to acceleration issues | Rule confirms regular appeal procedures govern acceleration appeals; time runs from imposition after acceleration; scope limited to acceleration order validity |
| Whether termination from Drug or Mental Health Court appeals follow acceleration rules | Termination appeals should mirror acceleration-of-deferred-sentence procedure | State may assert different mechanisms or limits apply | Rule states termination from Drug Court and Mental Health Court follow acceleration-appeal procedures, citing Hager and Tate as guiding precedents |
Key Cases Cited
- Tate v. State, 313 P.3d 274 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (recognized right to appeal certain mental-health court terminations)
- Gonseth v. State, 871 P.2d 51 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (governs appeals related to deferred judgment and sentence procedures)
- Hager v. State, 990 P.2d 894 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (applies acceleration-appeal procedure to Drug Court termination)
- Lookingbill v. State, 157 P.3d 130 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (addresses issues arising from deferred judgments and related appeals)