IN RE REVISION OF PORTION OF RULES OF COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
2017 OK CR 4
| Okla. Crim. App. | 2017Background
- Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals issued an order on Feb. 24, 2017 revising and republishing portions of Rule 1.2(D) of the Court's Rules to align rule text with recent case law.
- Revision specifically acknowledges the right of appeal recognized in Tate v. State and clarifies conformity with Gonseth v. State regarding appeals from Orders Deferring Imposition of Judgment and Sentence (deferred-judgment cases).
- The amended Rule 1.2 categorizes methods of appeal (regular appeals, certiorari, state/municipality appeals, juvenile/youthful offender appeals, resentencing, expungement) and clarifies procedures for various post-conviction and collateral matters.
- The order clarifies appellate timing and scope for: revocation of suspended sentences, appeals of terms of probation in deferred-judgment orders, acceleration proceedings (when deferred judgment is vacated and sentence imposed), and appeals from termination of Drug Court and Mental Health Court participation.
- Key points: (1) defendants may appeal probation terms imposed with a deferred judgment; (2) defendants may separately seek certiorari review to challenge plea validity if sentence is later accelerated; (3) failure to challenge plea validity when appealing probation terms generally waives later challenge to the plea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 1.2 should expressly recognize the right to appeal termination from Mental Health Court per Tate | Tate recognized a right to appeal such terminations; rule should acknowledge that right | Court rules did not clearly reflect Tate; clarification needed | Court revised Rule 1.2(D)(6)(a) to expressly reference Tate and the right to appeal termination from Mental Health Court |
| Whether Rule must conform to Gonseth regarding appeals from Orders Deferring Imposition of Judgment and Sentence | Defendant may appeal probation terms and/or plea validity; procedures should permit separate appeals | Concern that rule language conflicted with Gonseth and related precedents | Court amended Rule 1.2(D)(5)(a) to conform to Gonseth and related authorities, clarifying separate appeals for probation terms and plea challenges |
| Scope and timing of appeals when sentence is accelerated after a deferred judgment | A defendant seeking to challenge only acceleration errors should use regular appeal procedures with timing upon imposition of judgment | Alternatively, plea validity challenges after acceleration require certiorari; overlapping filings need notice | Court clarified: acceleration-issue appeals follow regular felony/misdemeanor rules; certiorari required to attack plea validity after acceleration; timing commences on imposition after acceleration |
| Whether failure to appeal plea validity when appealing probation conditions waives later challenge to plea | Defendant may preserve plea challenge for later certiorari after acceleration | Court cautioned that allowing both later could undermine finality; rule should deter piecemeal litigation | Court held failure to challenge plea validity when appealing probation terms generally constitutes waiver of right to challenge the plea later in other proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Tate v. State, 313 P.3d 274 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (recognized right to appeal certain terminations from Mental Health Court)
- Gonseth v. State, 871 P.2d 51 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (addressed right and procedure for appeals involving Orders Deferring Imposition of Judgment and Sentence)
- Lookingbill v. State, 157 P.3d 130 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (discussed appellate procedures related to deferred judgments)
- Hager v. State, 990 P.2d 894 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (applied appeal procedure parallels for Drug Court termination)