In RE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF TEXAS v. the State of Texas, 605 S.W.3d 47

Background

Republican Party of Texas contracted with Houston First to host its state convention at the George R. Brown Convention Center; the convention selects presidential electors.
Contract was amended (end of March 2020) to reserve July 13–18, 2020, and expressly defined Force Majeure to include pandemics affecting Houston and orders restricting gatherings issued within 30 days of the event.
The Party worked with Houston First on COVID-19 safety measures (floor plans, cleaning, CDC/local training).
Mayor Turner urged cancellation, then Houston First notified the Party on July 8 that it was canceling under the force-majeure clause.
The Party sued in Harris County seeking TRO/ injunction/ declaratory relief for breach of contract; the district court denied emergency relief, and the Party sought mandamus from the Texas Supreme Court. Justice Devine dissented, arguing mandamus should issue to compel performance.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Tex. Elec. Code §273.061 authorizes mandamus to compel a private party’s contractual obligation connected to a party convention	Section 273.061 permits mandamus to compel any "duty imposed by law" in connection with holding a convention; contractual duties are "legal duties."	Narrow reading: "duty imposed by law" excludes private contractual obligations; statute aimed at statutory/constitutional duties.	Devine: contractual duties are "duties imposed by law" (Black’s definition); §273.061 authorizes mandamus to compel performance.
Whether Houston First validly invoked the contract’s force‑majeure clause to cancel	Force‑majeure inapplicable because it requires a discrete ‘‘occurrence’’ and contractual impossibility; parties had implemented safety measures so performance was possible.	Pandemic and mayoral orders triggered the clause; cancellation was within contractual rights.	Devine: invocation fails—pandemic is ongoing (no discrete triggering occurrence), notice requirement not satisfied, and performance was not rendered impossible.
Whether specific performance (injunctive relief compelling use of venue) is available	Money damages inadequate to protect the Party’s method of selecting electors and constitutional interests; Party tendered performance (deposits); equity supports specific performance.	(Implicit) Damages adequate or injunction inappropriate for ordinary contract dispute.	Devine: specific performance appropriate—equitable remedy necessary to protect election-related rights.
Whether the City can avoid jurisdiction by labeling its act "contractual" and thereby evade constitutional claims tied to the contract	Relator: constitutional rights are bound up with the City’s contract; statutory mandamus jurisdiction should reach contractual breaches that threaten the electoral process.	Majority/SG urged limiting statute and relying on statutory definition of "law" to avoid expansion of mandamus jurisdiction.	Devine: cannot let label dodge jurisdiction; Court should not construe §273.061 narrowly when contracts are integral to holding conventions.

Key Cases Cited

Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLaney, 809 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1991) (distinguishing duties created by contract from duties "imposed by law" in tort context)
Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. 2014) (courts may rely on dictionary definitions in statutory interpretation)
Cadena Commercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Bev. Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. 2017) (use of ordinary-meaning tools in interpreting statutes)
DiGiuseppe v. Lawler, 269 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. 2008) (elements and standards for specific performance)
Lone Star Salt Co. v. Tex. S. L. R. Co., 90 S.W. 863 (Tex. 1906) (equitable relief and inadequacy of legal remedy)
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (U.S. 2008) (political parties’ constitutional right to structure internal processes)
Perlman v. Pioneer P’ship, 918 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussion of force‑majeure and contractual impossibility)