In re Raymond G. Earle, 2016-180

Petitioner Raymond G. Earle was charged with grand larceny and felony unlawful mischief for logging trees alleged to be on another’s land; he initially pleaded not guilty.
Pursuant to a plea agreement in April 2013, Earle pleaded guilty to grand larceny (two-to-five years to serve) and the State withdrew the unlawful mischief charge.
At the change-of-plea hearing, the prosecutor and defense counsel described disputed boundary markings; Earle acknowledged logging well past the boundary but expressed uncertainty whether he knew he was on the owner’s land.
The trial court’s colloquy asked whether Earle “had the knowledge or should have had the knowledge” that he was taking trees he had no right to take; Earle said he “should have known.”
Seven months after sentencing Earle filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief (later amended) arguing the court misstated the mens rea for grand larceny under V.R.Cr.P. 11(f), and thus there was no factual basis for his guilty plea.
The superior court denied Earle’s summary judgment motion and granted summary judgment to the State; the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to allow withdrawal of the plea.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the plea colloquy satisfied V.R.Cr.P. 11(f)’s factual-basis requirement	Earle: court misstated mens rea (treated "should have known" as sufficient), so he never admitted intent to steal	State: colloquy and admissions show Earle acknowledged he was on owner’s property and lacked right to take trees	Court: Reversed — colloquy misstated mens rea and could have induced plea; Rule 11(f) not satisfied
Whether the record affirmatively shows facts satisfying each element of grand larceny	Earle: record lacks his admission of the required intent to steal	State: facts and admissions (going onto property, taking trees) suffice to infer intent	Court: Intent requires more than negligence; plea acceptance based on "should have known" is legally insufficient
Whether collateral attack on Rule 11(f) requires prejudice showing	Earle: no prejudice showing required for Rule 11(f) defects	State: (did not contest in superior court)	Court: Confirmed collateral attack under Rule 11(f) needs no prejudice showing; reversal appropriate
Remedy — whether plea should be withdrawn	Earle: seeks leave to withdraw guilty plea	State: opposed in superior court (no opposition filed at summary-judgment stage)	Court: Remanded with judgment allowing withdrawal of plea

In re Miller, 185 Vt. 550 (2009) (requires record to affirmatively show facts satisfying each element of offense)
State v. Yates, 169 Vt. 20 (1999) (defendant must admit and understand facts as they relate to law for all elements)
State v. Reed, 127 Vt. 532 (1969) (larceny requires taking with intention to keep wrongfully; intent determined by trespasser’s state of mind)
State v. Hanson, 141 Vt. 228 (1982) (larceny requires intent to steal at the moment of taking)
In re Dunham, 144 Vt. 444 (1984) (Rule 11(f) requires defendant understand that admitted conduct violates law)
In re Grega, 175 Vt. 631 (2003) (mem.) (burden on PCR petitioner to prove fundamental errors by preponderance)
In re Stocks, 196 Vt. 160 (2014) (standard of review for superior court summary-judgment decisions)