In re Rayford
50 Cal.App.5th 754
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- In 2004 Rayford and Glass participated in a group confrontation and shooting at Sheila Lair’s house; they were convicted of 11 counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling.
- The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.66.1 (the "kill zone" / concurrent intent theory). The prosecutor defined the kill zone broadly as a "zone of risk."
- Trial evidence showed multiple shooters fired a total of about eight bullets toward the house from two directions; bullets penetrated walls and grazed or struck two occupants, but most named victims’ precise locations were unestablished.
- On direct appeal the convictions were affirmed but gang and firearm enhancements were vacated (Rayford I). Rayford and Glass later sought habeas relief arguing the kill zone instruction was improper.
- The California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Canizales narrowed the kill-zone doctrine (requiring a primary target and that the only reasonable inference is intent to kill everyone in a zone of fatal harm) and the Court of Appeal reconsidered the petitions in light of Canizales.
- The Court of Appeal held Canizales applies retroactively, found the kill-zone instruction legally improper on these facts (and compounded by the prosecutor’s arguments), and granted habeas relief by vacating the 11 attempted-murder convictions.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retroactivity of Canizales | Rayford/Glass: Canizales should apply to their final convictions | People: Canizales should not apply retroactively to final cases | Held: Canizales is retroactive on habeas review (applies under Mutch/Teague/Johnson/Martinez analyses) |
| Whether evidence supported a kill-zone instruction | Rayford/Glass: Evidence does not permit only one reasonable inference of intent to kill everyone in a kill zone | People: Circumstances (proximity, shots into house, bullets through walls, injuries) support a kill-zone inference | Held: Evidence permitted reasonable alternative inference (conscious disregard / intent to scare/punish), so kill-zone instruction was not supported |
| Instructional adequacy (CALJIC No. 8.66.1 and prosecutor’s argument) | Rayford/Glass: Instruction and prosecutor’s definition conflated kill zone with a mere zone of risk | People: Instruction was not misleading; jurors also had correct primary-target instruction | Held: Instruction failed to define kill zone properly and prosecutor’s framing broadened it to a legally inadequate theory |
| Prejudice / harmless error | Rayford/Glass: Error was prejudicial because verdicts may rest on legally inadequate theory | People: Any error was harmless because jury also had correct theory and substantial evidence supports convictions | Held: Error was prejudicial under Chapman; cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt verdicts did not rest on the invalid kill-zone theory, so attempted-murder convictions vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (Cal. 2019) (narrows kill-zone theory; requires primary target and that only reasonable inference is intent to kill everyone in zone)
- People v. Bland, 28 Cal.4th 313 (Cal. 2002) (earlier articulation and examples of kill-zone doctrine)
- People v. Perez, 50 Cal.4th 222 (Cal. 2010) (rejected kill-zone application for single distant shot)
- Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (U.S. 1965) (pre-Teague federal retroactivity balancing test)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (federal rule limiting retroactivity of new constitutional rules on collateral review)
- In re Johnson, 3 Cal.3d 404 (Cal. 1970) (California tripartite retroactivity factors)
- People v. Mutch, 4 Cal.3d 389 (Cal. 1971) (retroactivity where decision vindicates original statutory meaning)
- In re Martinez, 3 Cal.5th 1216 (Cal. 2017) (applied Mutch/Teague approach to retroactivity issues)
- People v. Aledamat, 8 Cal.5th 1 (Cal. 2019) (Chapman harmless-error standard applies to legally inadequate alternative-theory instructions)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (U.S. 2004) (distinguishes substantive vs. procedural rules for retroactivity)