In re R.C
2016 COA 166
| Colo. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- R.C., a 14-year-old student, took a photo of classmate L.P., drew a penis (appearing to ejaculate) over the photo using Snapchat, and showed the doctored image to L.P. and other students.
- L.P. felt humiliated; classmates laughed and encouraged an apology; L.P. and friends later reported the incident to school authorities.
- Police charged R.C. with disorderly conduct under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-106(1)(a) (making an obviously offensive display in a public place that tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace).
- After a bench trial the juvenile court adjudicated R.C. delinquent and sentenced him to probation, therapy, and community work.
- On appeal the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Snapchat image did not constitute "fighting words" because it was not inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent response under the circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C.'s display constituted unprotected "fighting words" under the disorderly conduct statute | The People: the doctored photo was coarse and offensive and tended to incite an immediate breach of the peace (equivalent to epithets like "cocksucker") | R.C.: the image was protected speech; it did not meet the fighting-words standard and lacked evidence it was likely to provoke immediate violence | Reversed: the display was not "fighting words" as a matter of law given context and modern standards |
| Whether prosecution proved R.C. knew or recklessly disregarded that the display would provoke immediate violence | The People: argued implicitly that R.C. should have known the likely effect | R.C.: no evidence he intended or recklessly disregarded risk of immediate violence | Court did not reach this issue after resolving first issue in defendant's favor |
| Whether mere emotional injury or humiliation suffices to deprive speech of First Amendment protection | The People: humiliation and implication about sexual conduct/orientation supports suppression | R.C.: emotional harm is insufficient; fighting-words doctrine requires propensity to incite immediate breach of the peace | Held: emotional injury alone is insufficient; statute targets only speech tending to cause immediate violence |
| Whether references to sexual orientation or sexualized depictions are per se fighting words | The People/Dissent: image implied sexual conduct and could be expected to provoke violence | R.C./Majority: mere insinuation of homosexuality or vulgar sexual depiction does not automatically equate to fighting words | Held: not per se; context must be examined and here it did not meet the fighting-words threshold |
Key Cases Cited
- Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (articulated the "fighting words" doctrine)
- Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (speech must produce a clear and present danger of serious substantive evil to be unprotected)
- Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (clarified limits of "opprobrious" speech as fighting words)
- Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement standard requiring likelihood of imminent lawless action)
- Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (schools may discipline certain vulgar student speech)
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (limits on content-based restrictions even for provocative symbolic acts)
- Hansen v. People, 190 Colo. 457 (1976) (Colorado interpretation of fighting words under state law)
- Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800 (Colo. 2005) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence on appeal)