In re R.A.M.
411 P.3d 814
Colo. Ct. App.2014Background
- Mother filed a petition to relinquish custody of B.G.B. to an adoption agency and sought termination of the only-named father's parental rights; father was served while incarcerated.
- Father responded contesting relinquishment, requested DNA testing, a writ to appear, and said he was unprepared and expected to have counsel.
- At the hearing the court heard part of mother's testimony ex parte (without father or his representative), then had father brought in; father repeatedly asked for time and for an attorney and said he might not be the biological father.
- The court did not advise father of the nature of the hearing, burdens, or inquire about his ability to afford counsel; it did not order genetic testing.
- The court interpreted the relinquishment statute to require that a nonrelinquishing parent be able to assume custody "at the time of the hearing," found father unable to do so because he was incarcerated, and terminated his parental rights.
- Father later filed a timely C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion arguing the termination judgment was void for violation of his due process right to counsel; the trial court denied relief but appointed counsel for appeal. Appellate court reviews denial de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether father sufficiently requested counsel | Father asserts he repeatedly asked for time and an attorney and said he did not know his rights | Agency argued father never formally invoked a right to counsel and must do so | Court: father’s statements adequately expressed desire for counsel; request was sufficient |
| Whether due process required appointment of counsel at the relinquishment hearing | Father: due process (Lassiter/Eldridge) required counsel given limited procedural protections, legal complexity, and high risk of erroneous deprivation | Agency: Lassiter presumption against appointed counsel applies because no physical liberty at stake and state interests strong | Court: Under Eldridge factors, risk of erroneous deprivation was high and due process required appointment of counsel in these circumstances |
| Whether procedure used (ex parte testimony, no advisement, no paternity test) was fundamentally fair without counsel | Father: lack of notice of the specific statutory allegation, inability to cross-examine mother, and denial of testing made proceeding unfair | Agency: proceeded consistent with their statutory reading and court discretion | Court: Procedural deficiencies (no advisement, evidence taken ex parte, no genetic testing) heightened risk of error and required counsel |
| Statutory interpretation issues affecting outcome (paternity testing; timing of ability to assume custody) | Father: needed counsel to argue broader interpretation (e.g., ability to assume custody shortly after release; obtain DNA test) | Agency: statute requires ability to assume custody "at the time of the hearing" and genetic testing not required unless parent able to assume custody | Court: These statutory questions were legally significant and complex; absence of counsel increased risk of error |
Key Cases Cited
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (due process requires fundamentally fair procedures before terminating parental rights)
- Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (appointment of counsel in parental termination cases analyzed case-by-case using Eldridge factors)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (three-factor balancing test for what due process requires)
- People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1982) (discussion of procedural protections in parental-termination context)
- C.S. v. People, 83 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2004) (applying Eldridge factors to right to counsel in dependency/neglect context)
- In re C.L.S., 252 P.3d 556 (Colo.App. 2011) (judgment entered in violation of due process is void; Rule 60(b) relief)
- In re C.A.O., 192 P.3d 508 (Colo.App. 2008) (dependency/neglect counsel-right analysis)