In re Plummer, 513 B.R. 135

Debtors seek sanctions against Hickey for a post-discharge judgment that allegedly violated §524(a)’s discharge injunction.
The dispute centers on whether the Debtors surrendered the real property securing Hickey’s loan.
Hickey obtained a state foreclosure judgment imposing in-personam liability for his attorney’s fees, post-discharge.
Debtors argued they fulfilled their surrender obligations under §521(a)(2) and were not required to deed the property.
The court found Debtors did surrender via allowing possession by available legal means and rejected the need to execute a deed; sanctions awarded for the improper fee request.
The sanction amount is $4,411.88, jointly and severally against Hickey and his attorney, with personal liability reversed for Debtors.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
What constitutes surrender under §521(a)(2)?	Plummer argues surrender required no deed; they did what was necessary.	Hickey contends surrender required deed to transfer property.	Surrender does not require delivery of the deed; actions allowing possession via available legal means suffice.
Did the Foreclosure Judgment’s in-personam fee award violate §524(a)(2)?	Debtors claim post-discharge fees violated discharge injunction.	Hickey argues fees were earned under the mortgage; no violation.	Yes, the attorney’s fees tied to discharged pre-petition debt violated §524(a)(2); partial voiding authorized.
Should the state court order be voided to the extent of personal liability?	Debtors seek voiding of the personal-liability portion.	Hickey seeks enforcement of the fee award.	Part of the Foreclosure Judgment (paragraph 10(b)) void; the remainder remains enforceable.
Are sanctions appropriate here and in what amount?	Sanctions warranted for willful violation of discharge injunction; seek $20,000 punitive and actual damages.	Hickey contends no sanctions or lower damages.	Sanctions awarded; actual damages $4,411.88; no punitive damages; jointly and severally against Hickey and his attorney.

In re Taylor, 3 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1993) (surrender is a performance obligation, not just notice; ride-through context referenced)
In re Pratt, 462 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2006) (surrender not defined in §521(a)(2); context-specific meaning used)
In re Cornejo, 342 B.R. 834 (Bankr.M.D. Fla. 2005) (discusses surrender mechanics and collateral ownership in bankruptcy)
Theobald v. Green Tree (In re Theobald), 218 B.R. 133 (10th Cir. BAP 1998) (addresses surrender concept and state-law implications in real property cases)
In re White, 487 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2007) (defines surrender in Chapter 13 context as relinquishment of rights, not necessarily immediate delivery)