In Re Petition Records Release v., 27 F.4th 84

Background

In 1971 two federal grand juries in Boston investigated Daniel Ellsberg's disclosure of the Pentagon Papers; Samuel Popkin was subpoenaed, refused to answer on some topics, and was held in civil contempt.
Jill Lepore (historian) sought decades-later access to sealed grand jury records at the National Archives via FOIA; the request was denied citing FOIA exemption and Rule 6(e) grand-jury secrecy.
Lepore petitioned the district court under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) (asserting inherent judicial authority, not that Rule 6(e) itself authorized release); the district court ordered disclosure, invoking Rule 6(e)(6) and inherent authority, subject to possible redactions.
The government appealed; the First Circuit stayed the release and reversed the district court.
The First Circuit held Rule 6(e)(6) does not imply an authorization to disclose, and even assuming some inherent authority to release grand jury materials exists, that power cannot be exercised solely on the basis of historical interest divorced from protecting the fair administration of justice.
The court emphasized separation of functions: decisions to relax grand-jury secrecy for historical/public-interest reasons are better left to Congress or the Rules Committee, and noted a split among circuits on the scope of inherent supervisory power over grand juries.

Issues

Issue	Lepore's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 6(e)(6) authorizes courts to order disclosure of sealed grand jury records because secrecy is no longer necessary	Rule 6(e)(6)'s recordkeeping/sealing text implies courts may unseal when secrecy is unnecessary	Rule 6(e)(6) merely mandates sealing; it does not authorize disclosure	Reversed: Rule 6(e)(6) does not imply a disclosure authorization
Whether federal courts have inherent/supervisory authority to disclose grand jury materials beyond Rule 6(e)'s enumerated exceptions	Courts retain inherent authority over judicial records and may disclose where appropriate, including historically significant records	Any inherent authority is narrow and cannot override or expand Rule 6(e); courts’ power over grand juries is limited	Assumed arguendo some inherent authority exists, but underscored it is limited and constrained by Rule 6(e)
Whether historical or public-interest value alone can justify disclosure under inherent authority	Historical significance alone can justify release; courts can apply a discretionary, fact-sensitive balancing test	Historical interest alone is insufficient; disclosure must serve fair administration of justice	Held: Historical interest alone is not a permissible basis; inherent power must be tied to protecting/furthering the fair administration of justice
Whether ancillary arguments (judicial-record label, Advisory Committee views) alter the result	Grand jury materials are judicial records and Advisory Committee materials suggest courts may release historically significant records	Judicial-record status is constrained by grand jury's arm's-length relationship; Advisory Committee post‑hoc views do not supply judicial authority	Held: Those arguments do not change the outcome; policy change belongs to Congress or the Rules Committee

Key Cases Cited

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (background: Pentagon Papers litigation)
Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960) (describes longstanding grand‑jury secrecy rule and its purposes)
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979) (limits on courts evaluating matters beyond their expertise; grand‑jury secrecy interests)
Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996) (recognizes courts' inherent authority but urges caution)
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (foundational discussion of inherent powers and limitations)
Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40 (2016) (inherent power must be a reasonable response to problems facing court)
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (federal courts' power over grand jury procedure is very limited)
In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997) (held historical interest can, in some circumstances, justify disclosure)
Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2016) (permissive view: Rule 6(e) not exclusive; supervisory authority may allow disclosure)
Pitch v. United States, 953 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (held Rule 6(e) exhaustive; no inherent supervisory power to disclose outside Rule 6)
In re Grand Jury Proc., 417 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (First Circuit recognizing limited inherent power to impose secrecy orders incident to matters before the court)