In re Petition of T.W.M., 18 A.3d 815

T.E. was born in 2001 to S.E. and T.B. and placed in CFSA foster care in 2001 after being abandoned at the hospital.
A.E., S.E.’s cousin, began supervised visits with T.E. in 2003 and later had unsupervised visits; both S.E. and T.B. consented to A.E.’s adoption petition.
T.W.M. had caregiving responsibility for most of T.E.’s life and sought to adopt T.E. with T.E.’s consent.
In 2006, the trial court granted T.W.M.’s adoption petition and denied A.E.’s petition; this was reversed on appeal and remanded for reconsideration of consent and best interests.
After remand, a 2009 evidentiary hearing occurred with multiple witnesses for all sides; the trial court again held that A.E.’s adoption would be contrary to T.E.’s best interests.
The court affirmed the denial of A.E.’s petition and the adoption by T.W.M., concluding no abuse of discretion in weighing best interests or considering T.E.’s minimal direct input.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the court properly weighed the birth parents’ consent against T.E.’s best interests	A.E. and GAL argue the court erred by not giving weight to the birth parents’ choice	T.W.M. and the court held the best interests weighed against A.E. due to attachment and stability	Yes; the court’s weighing was proper and supported by clear and convincing evidence
Whether the court sufficiently considered T.E.’s own view of her best interests	A.E. and GAL contend the court failed to consider T.E. directly or via admitted evidence	Court relied on expert testimony and other record evidence to assess T.E.’s preferences	Yes; court adequately considered T.E.’s preferences in the record and did not need direct questioning
Whether the court abused its discretion by not questioning T.E. directly or indirectly	GAL urged questions to elicit T.E.’s preference; failure to do so was error	Courts may rely on experts and avoid probing the child directly when risk of harm exists	No; court acted within discretion not to question the child directly or indirectly
Whether the trial court remained impartial and constitutional standards were met	Arguments of bias from A.E., T.B., S.E.	Record shows no impermissible hostility or bias	Affirmed; court not shown to be biased

In re T.W.M., 964 A.2d 595 (D.C. 2009) (adoption weighty consideration to birth parents’ preference; remand for anew best-interests determination)
In re T.J., 666 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1995) (standard of proof and best-interests framework)
In re C.A.B., 4 A.3d 890 (D.C. 2010) (balancing best interests and parental choice; termination-like factors)
In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413 (D.C. 2009) (best-interests factors; caution on evidentiary weight)
In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470 (D.C. 1996) (court may consider child’s input to extent feasible; judge not required to obtain direct testimony)
In re I.B., 631 A.2d 1225 (D.C. 1993) (sufficiency of findings and non-formalistic review)
In re J.L., 884 A.2d 1072 (D.C. 2005) (utility of evidence and expert testimony in best interests)
In re L.D.H., 776 A.2d 570 (D.C. 2001) (impartiality assessment in trial court)
In re W.E.T., 793 A.2d 471 (D.C. 2002) (stability of long-term environment in best interests)
Rutledge v. Harris, 263 A.2d 256 (D.C. 1970) (early stability considerations in custody)